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WHO OWNS THE SOUL OF THE CHILD?: AN 
ESSAY ON RELIGIOUS PARENTING RIGHTS 




I. INTRODUCTION : WHAT DOES ARMAGEDDON HAVE TO 
DO WITH BETTY SIMMONS? 
For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we 
define first and then see.1 
  Walter Lippmann 
 
Betty Simmons was nine years old when she accompanied 
Sarah Prince, her aunt and guardian, to distribute religious 
literature on the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts.2  Mrs. 
Prince did not ordinarily permit Betty to engage in preaching 
activity on the streets at night, but on the evening of December 
18, 1941, she reluctantly yielded to Betty‘s entreaties and 
(perhaps more difficult to resist) her tears.3  Both Mrs. Prince 
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 1. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 54–55 (First Free Press Paperback 
ed. 1965) (1922). 
 2. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159–60 (1944). 
 3. Id. at 161–62. 
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and Betty were Jehovah‘s Witnesses, for whom street preaching 
is a religious duty.4 For Betty, street preaching was work 
commanded by the Lord, but it was work that she loved to do.  It 
was a way of worshipping God.5 For the legislators of 
Massachusetts, however, Betty‘s religious work was something 
else entirely: a violation of the state‘s child labor laws.  These 
statutes prohibited children from selling or offering to sell ―any 
newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of 
merchandise of any description . . . in any street or public place.‖6  
Criminal sanctions were imposed on parents and guardians ―who 
compel or permit minors in their control to engage in the 
prohibited transactions.‖7  Sarah Prince was convicted on several 
counts, and, for the most part, the judgment of the trial court was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.8  Mrs. Prince 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.9 
The case of Prince v. Massachusetts is well known for its 
conclusion that ―the family itself is not beyond regulation in the 
public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.‖10  In 
Prince, the Court stressed that the state, acting as parens 
patriae—acting, that is, in its capacity as protector of those 
unable to protect themselves—is responsible for the general 
welfare of young people.11  As parens patriae (literally, as parent 
of the country), the state may protect children against the 
misconduct of their own parents and guardians.12  The state‘s 
parens patriae authority, according to the Prince Court, is ―not 
nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control 
the child‘s course of conduct on religion or conscience.‖13  Pointing 
to a number of state regulations (such as child labor and 
compulsory schooling laws) that interfered with religious 
 
 4. Id. at 161. 
 5. Id. at 162–63. 
 6. Id. at 172 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Commonwealth v. Prince, 46 N.E.2d 755, 759–60 (Mass. 1943). 
 9. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160 (1944). 
 10. Id. at 166. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 166–67. 
 13. Id. at 166. 
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parenting rights, the Court rejected Mrs. Prince‘s contention that 
such regulations can be justified only by a clear and present 
danger to the child.14  While a regulation of adult religious 
activity might require the state to show that it had a truly 
compelling justification, no such showing was necessary where 
children are involved.15  ―The state‘s authority over children‘s 
activities,‖ the Court insisted, ―is broader than over like actions 
of adults.‖16 Thus, the Court concluded that the state was 
required to show only that it had a legitimate (not a compelling) 
interest to promote the public‘s health, welfare, or safety, and 
that it had used a means—here, a restriction on commercial 
activity by children—reasonably related to its purpose (not the 
least restrictive means possible).17  Child labor laws served ―the 
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that 
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given 
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens.‖18  For the Court, it was simply too 
late to doubt that legislation designed to protect children is 
within the state‘s police power, ―whether against the parent‘s 
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate 
contrary action.‖19  Mrs. Prince was not entitled to an exemption 
from the general law of the state regulating child labor.20 
Its focus on the welfare of the child notwithstanding, the 
Prince Court managed to ignore the real child whose welfare was 
the central issue of this landmark case.  For one thing, no one on 
the Court suggested that Betty may have been too young to 
choose such a strong religious commitment.  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Rutledge noted that ―Betty believed it was her 
religious duty to perform this work and failure would bring 
condemnation ‗to everlasting destruction at Armageddon.‘‖21  On 
this point, the Court‘s four dissenting justices agreed with the 
 
 14. Id. at 166–167. 
 15. Id. at 167–168. 
 16. Id. at 168. 
 17. Id. at 170–71. 
 18. Id. at 165. 
 19. Id. at 168–69. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 163. 
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majority: Betty wanted to accompany her aunt, motivated to 
engage in missionary evangelism by her love of the Lord.22  Mrs. 
Prince‘s brief to the Court also stressed that Betty ―desired to 
serve Almighty God.‖23  Her service was freely given to the Lord.  
In Mrs. Prince‘s words: 
[Betty] was serving Jehovah God and not her guardian, not any 
man, not the society or any earthly institution.  The girl 
desired to pay her vows unto her God.  Since she was thus 
serving Jehovah it cannot be said that she was working for any 
creature on earth.  No man or government has authority to 
punish a child or another creature because the child is 
permitted to serve Jehovah God.24 
From this point of view, Betty‘s street preaching was not child 
labor at all. 
No constitutional truism is more universally accepted than 
Justice Jackson‘s famous assertion, in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, that ―no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.‖25 In Barnette, the Supreme Court 
protected school children against the action of local authorities, 
who, by compelling the flag salute and pledge, had ―transcend[ed] 
constitutional limitations‖ on the authority of the state.26  The 
injury caused by such a compelled statement of belief was a 
 
 22. See id. at 171–72 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 23. Brief for Appellant at 34, Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (No. 98). 
 24. Id. 
 25. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); cf. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 
(1947) (―The ‗establishment of religion‘ clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to 
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance.  No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever 
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.‖). 
 26. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
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grievous one, a blow to the intellectual and moral personhood of 
the young children. The compulsory flag salute and pledge 
―require[d] affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.‖27  By 
forcing the children to utter what was not in their minds,28 the 
state had invaded ―the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control.‖29 
In the catalogue of opinions not subject to official 
prescription, religion occupies a privileged place. The 
Constitution‘s commitment to religious freedom arises from the 
assumption that religious principles are uniquely the dictates of 
conscience.  Because religion is, as James Madison put it, ―the 
duty which we owe to our Creator . . . it can be directed only by 
reason and conviction, not by force or violence.‖30  Not, that is, by 
 
 27. Id. at 633. 
 28. Id. at 634. 
 29. Id. at 642.  On the First Amendment as protective of individual dignity, 
see, for example, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (―The 
constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as 
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove 
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the 
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in 
the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable 
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would 
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests.‖) (emphasis added); cf., e.g., Stephen Arons & Charles 
Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness:  A First Amendment Critique 
of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 312 (1980) (―The first amendment 
is . . . a statement of the dignity and worth of every individual.‖); Thomas I. 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 
879 (1963) (―[E]xpression is an integral part of the development of ideas, of 
mental exploration and of the affirmation of self.  The power to realize his 
potentiality as a human being begins at this point and must extend at least this 
far if the whole nature of man is not to be thwarted.  Hence suppression of 
belief, opinion and expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of 
man‘s essential nature.‖); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 483 (1995) (―Compelling people through threat of legal 
sanction to say words that they don‘t want to say is as much an affront to 
dignity as many other laws the Court has invalidated.‖). 
 30. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 18 (Robert 
S. Alley ed., 1988); cf. Thomas Jefferson, The Statute of Virginia for Religious 
Freedom (1786), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS 
EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY xvii (Merrill D. Peterson 
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the state. Even a benign expression of religious views by the 
state ―may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce,‖ calling into 
question the voluntariness, and thus the genuineness, of belief.31  
―A state-created orthodoxy,‖ the Court has said, ―puts at grave 
risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole 
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.‖32 
But, for children, the threat to freedom of belief and 
conscience is no less grave when it comes from private 
orthodoxies, and the injury to the child caused by private 
coercion is no less grievous.  The realm of intellect and spirit is 
invaded when children are forced to believe what other people 
believe, or kept from believing what other people do not believe, 
even if—and, perhaps, especially when—those ―others‖ are their 
parents or religious mentors. Yet children are left legally 
unprotected from most forms of private religious coercion.  
Indeed, where the religious upbringing of children is involved, 
freedom of belief can lose its customary meaning.  Somehow, 
Betty‘s fear of ―everlasting destruction‖ showed that her 
evangelical desires were the product of free choice.  The Court 
did not pause to consider whether Betty‘s religious training had 
left her unable to choose—freely to choose, or freely to reject—the 
religious commitments of her guardian.  Theologically, we might 
wonder how free a young child can be to make religious choices 
when the consequences of choosing wrongly are so stark.  More 
relevant to the Court‘s work, we should wonder what it means for 
the psychological welfare of a child to believe that her own 
conduct—or, in Betty‘s view, misconduct—could bring about her 
everlasting destruction. 
The Supreme Court did not stop to think about such things.  
It held against Mrs. Prince on the dubious basis that street 
preaching was dangerous work for children.33  But the Court 
chose to overlook a real risk of harm to Betty: the threat posed by 
a religious regime that makes genuine choice and real faith 
difficult, if not impossible.  Or perhaps it should be said not that 
 
& Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988). 
 31. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–71 (1944). 
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the Court ignored this harm, but that it could not see it.  The 
Court could not see the possibility that Betty‘s obedience was the 
product not of choice, but of the loss of choice, of childlike 
surrender to a familial authoritarianism.  The danger of 
emotional maltreatment was hidden in plain sight, but the Court 
could not challenge the cultural norm that parents have the right 
to form the religious beliefs of their children.  The Court was 
incapable of asking, What does Armageddon have to do with Betty 
Simmons? 
II. A TALE OF TWO LIBERTIES 
Sarah Prince rested her case on two liberties: the right of 
religious freedom (as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment) and the right to parent (under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  This 
combination of constitutional claims, as the Court observed, was 
an especially tough bulwark against state regulation: ―The 
parent‘s conflict with the state over control of the child and his 
training is serious enough when only secular matters are 
concerned.  It becomes the more so when an element of religious 
conviction enters.‖34  From Mrs. Prince‘s point of view, the state 
of Massachusetts had struck a blow at the parent‘s right of 
religious mentorship.  It was abundantly clear to Mrs. Prince 
that the state did not have the authority to interfere with this 
most sacred of religious duties and most natural of rights.  The 
family was ―the backbone of all orderly governments,‖ she 
argued; it was the source of a child‘s moral and social values.35  
The family preceded and transcended the authority of the state.  
―The family and home are institutions in their own right[,]‖ Mrs. 
Prince argued.36  ―They do not depend upon government for their 
creation. Long before organized government was established 
these institutions prevailed to secure the perpetuation of 
humanity.‖37 The role of the democratic state, accordingly, is ―to 
 
 34. Id. at 165. 
 35. Brief for Appellant, supra note 23, at 16. 
 36. Id. at 17. 
 37. Id. 
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protect and conserve the parental authority over children . . . 
regardless of how misguided others may think that appellant 
[i.e., Mrs. Prince] is in the spiritual education of the child and the 
practice of preaching according to the dictates of her 
conscience.‖38  Mrs. Prince could not follow the dictates of her 
conscience if she allowed Betty to stray from the true path.  
Really, then, for Mrs. Prince, there were not two liberties at 
stake; rather, the right of religious freedom and the right to 
parent were inseparably wound together.  The state could not 
strike at one without damaging the other. 
Mrs. Prince would lose this battle, but the struggle to secure 
religious parenting rights, though a prolonged one, would be 
largely successful, and that success would be due in no small part 
to the idea that religious parenting joins two indefeasible rights 
in indissoluble union.  Today, religious parenting rights enjoy a 
special constitutional protection from state regulation.  State 
action that burdens religious parenting is subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny (the kind of scrutiny that Mrs. Prince argued 
for), subject, that is, to the ―strict scrutiny‖ that is strict in theory 
but most often fatal in fact.  This is a degree of protection that 
neither the right of religious freedom nor the right to parent 
enjoys by itself. 
Strict scrutiny is usually reserved for state action that 
impinges upon an individual‘s fundamental rights (or 
discriminates against a group on impermissible grounds).39  Most 
laws receive a far more deferential review.40  Under ―rational 
basis review,‖ courts presume the constitutionality of 
legislation.41  The party trying to overcome this presumption 
must show (1) that the law serves no legitimate purpose, or (2) 
that the means employed by the law has no rational relation to 
the law‘s stated goal.42  Under a strict scrutiny standard, the 
 
 38. Id. at 18, 40. 
 39. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996). 
 40. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 720 (3d ed. 2009). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); U.S. 
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 177 (1980); and Allied 
Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959)). 
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court will presume that a law is unconstitutional.43  To overcome 
that presumption, the state must show (1) that the law serves a 
compelling purpose, and (2) that the means employed by the law 
are as narrowly tailored as possible to achieve the law‘s stated 
goal.44  Because the hurdle of strict scrutiny is so difficult to 
clear, the level of review employed by the court can easily 
determine the outcome of a case. 
Separately, neither the right of religious freedom nor the 
right to parent would trigger strict scrutiny.  The Supreme Court 
has said, in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, that state action restricting 
religious practice is constitutionally permissible unless it directly 
targets religious practice or discriminates against religious 
groups.45  Nor do parents have a fundamental right to direct the 
upbringing of their children.  The Supreme Court has used loose 
language about the fundamental right to parent, and this 
language has led to confusion among lower courts, but, as Justice 
Scalia has correctly observed, there is little support for the notion 
that the right to parent is a ―substantive constitutional right,‖ let 
alone a fundamental one.46  Combined, however, these rights 
 
 43. Id. at 719. 
 44. Id.; see also, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 45. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (―[F]ree exercise does not relieve an individual 
of the obligation to comply with a ‗valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).‘‖ (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
 46. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(―Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive 
constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children—two of 
them from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been 
repudiated.‖) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc‘y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)); see 
also, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(―The Supreme Court, however, has never expressly indicated whether this 
‗parental right,‘ when properly invoked against a state regulation, is 
fundamental, deserving strict scrutiny, or earns only a rational basis review. 
Our reading of the appropriate caselaw convinces us that rational basis review 
is appropriate.‖); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 
1995) (―[T]he Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the right to direct the 
upbringing and education of one‘s children is among those fundamental rights 
whose infringement merits heightened scrutiny.‖); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 
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form a constitutional firewall that shields parents from state 
interference in the religious upbringing of their children.  For the 
Supreme Court also has said, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, that when 
the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise 
claim, ―more than merely a ‗reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State‘ is required to sustain the 
validity of the State‘s requirement under the First 
Amendment.‖47 In these hybrid cases, strict scrutiny is 
warranted despite the fact that state action does not target 
religion or impinge upon a fundamental right.48 
The ―hybrid rights‖ doctrine survived Smith, though its scope 
was less than precisely defined.49  The Smith Court did make 
clear that the doctrine was an exception to general constitutional 
principles.50  But in the universe of religious parenting cases, the 
exception easily swallows the rule.  Because such cases are 
hybrid by definition, strict scrutiny becomes the norm, and the 
result is the creation of a separate sphere of the law where the 
government‘s ability to enforce the law is subject to an 
 
294, 299 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (―We reject Mrs. Baker‘s suggestion that this right is 
fundamental, and that the state can punish her child corporally only if it shows 
a compelling interest that outweighs her parental right. We do not read Meyer 
and Pierce to enshrine parental rights so high in the hierarchy of constitutional 
values.  In each case the parental right prevailed not because the Court termed 
it fundamental and the state‘s interest uncompelling, but because the Court 
considered the state‘s action to be arbitrary, without reasonable relation to an 
end legitimately within its power.  Nor has the Court subsequently spoken of 
parental rights as fundamental; on the contrary, its references to them lend 
support to the view that they are not.‖) (citations omitted), judgment aff’d 423 
U.S. 907 (1975) (per curiam). Broad claims are made for Meyer and Pierce, see, 
e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious 
Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 143 (2000) 
(describing Pierce as a ―ringing endorsement of religious freedom and of limited 
government dominion over citizens‖), but these seminal due process cases lend 
no support to the contention that the right to parent is fundamental. 
 47. 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
 48. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (suggesting a history of strict scrutiny 
review for ―Free Exercise Clause [claims] in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections‖ and for free speech cases also involving freedom of 
religion, but determining that Smith ―does not present such a hybrid situation‖) 
 49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
 50. See id. at 888 (applying strict scrutiny ―across the board‖ would be 
―courting anarchy‖). 
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individual‘s religious beliefs.51  In this sense, the Yoder Court did 
more than rescue Amish parents from state educational 
requirements. It created a private right to ignore generally 
applicable law.  Though the Court appeared to step back from the 
implications of the decision by limiting its holding to the unique 
facts of the case,52 the spirit of strict scrutiny, once summoned, 
would not be easily cabined.  Yoder became the precedential port 
from which a wealth of religious parenting cases would be 
launched, thus requiring courts to apply a rationale that 
contradicted constitutional tradition and common sense.53 
Where a hybrid claim is involved, the power of the parent 
may be limited by the state only ―if it appears that parental 
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have 
a potential for significant social burdens.‖54  This harm standard 
protects religious parenting rights at too great a cost: It sacrifices 
the best interests of the child in order to bolster parental 
authority.  It is a cost that children should not be asked to bear.  
The Supreme Court famously said as much to Sarah Prince: 
While parents may be free to become martyrs themselves, ―it 
does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make 
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full 
and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves.‖55 
III. A GUARANTEE OF FREE CHOICE 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
Justice Jackson wrote that public education is not free if its 
 
 51. See id. at 886 (compelling interest test would produce ―a private right 
to ignore generally applicable laws‖). 
 52. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229, 233 (―[T]he power of the state, as parens 
patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to children regardless of 
the wishes of their parents‖ cannot be sustained against a ―free exercise claim 
of the nature revealed by this record.‖) (emphasis added); id. at 236 (observing 
that the Court‘s judgment would apply to ―few other religious groups or sects‖). 
 53. See Smith, 494 U.S at 885 (―To make an individual‘s obligation to obey 
such a law contingent upon the law‘s coincidence with his religious beliefs . . . 
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.‖). 
 54. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
 55. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
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delivery is tied to ideological strings: ―Free public education, if 
faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality 
will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party,  or 
faction.‖56 Really, though, Jackson was not advocating ideological 
neutrality.  His words are a call to ―individual freedom of mind in 
preference to officially disciplined uniformity.‖57  Education is to 
nourish the ―free mind‖ of the child.  For the happily pre-
postmodern Jackson, the freedom to think for oneself is not just 
another form of official discipline.  It is the liberal and liberating 
ideology at the heart of our constitutional order. 
The Supreme Court has consistently put its faith in 
intellectual independence.  Freedom of mind is supported by 
specific constitutional guarantees, such as the freedoms of speech 
and religion; and, taken together, these liberties guarantee what 
constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe has described as ―a 
capacious realm of individual conscience . . . a ‗sphere of intellect 
and spirit‘ constitutionally secure from the machinations and 
manipulations of government.‖58  Or, as Justice Stewart more 
simply said, ―The Constitution guarantees . . . a society of free 
choice.‖59 
The Prince Court set these principles to work.  While ―the 
 
 56. 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); cf. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 
U.S. 1, 23–24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (The public school ―is organized on 
the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so 
that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain 
a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion.‖). 
 57. Barnette, 319 U.S at 637 (emphasis added). 
 58. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-5, at 1315 (2d 
ed. 1988) (―The Constitution has enumerated specific categories of thought and 
conscience for special treatment: religion and speech.  Courts have at times 
properly generalized from these protections . . . to derive a capacious realm of 
individual conscience, and to define a sphere of intellect and spirit 
constitutionally secure from the machinations and manipulations of 
government.‖ (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)). 
 59. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result) (―The First Amendment guarantees liberty of human 
expression in order to preserve in our Nation what Mr. Justice Holmes called a 
‗free trade in ideas.‘  To that end, the Constitution protects more than just a 
man‘s freedom to say or write or publish what he wants. It secures as well the 
liberty of each man to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will 
listen.  The Constitution guarantees, in short, a society of free choice.‖ (footnote 
omitted)). 
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custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents,‖60 and while parents enjoy the right ―to give [children] 
religious training and to encourage them in the practice of 
religious belief,‖61 neither rights of religion nor rights of 
parenthood are beyond limitation.62 To guard the general interest 
in youth‘s well-being, the Court maintained, the state may limit 
parental authority in things affecting the child‘s upbringing, 
including matters of conscience and religious conviction.63  The 
state‘s wide range of power is directed to ensure the welfare of 
both the child and society. Indeed, properly understood, the 
child‘s interest and the general interest are one and the same.  
For its continuance, the Court explained, ―[a] democratic society 
rests . . . upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people 
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.‖64 
But what does that imply?  What is ―healthy, well-rounded 
growth‖?  What does ―full maturity‖ mean?  The Court‘s answer 
was decidedly non-authoritarian: ―It is the interest of youth 
itself, and of the whole community, that children be both 
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into 
free and independent well-developed men and citizens.‖65 A 
democratic society rests on a model of maturation that takes as 
its norm the individual‘s full capacity to make free and 
independent choices.  This capacity, as the Supreme Court has 
affirmed on many occasions, is both the presupposition and the 
product of our First Amendment freedoms.66  The guarantee of a 
society of free choice ―presupposes the capacity of its members to 
choose.‖67 
 
 60. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 61. Id. at 165. 
 62. Id. at 166. 
 63. Id. at 165–70. 
 64. Id. at 168. 
 65. Id. at 165. 
 66. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.629 (1968); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40 (listing the advancement of personhood and 
autonomy as a major rationale for protecting freedom of speech). 
 67. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (―[T]he 
Constitution protects more than just a man‘s freedom to say or write or publish 
what he wants.  It secures as well the liberty of each man to decide for himself 
what he will read and to what he will listen. The Constitution guarantees, in 
SHULMAN (FINAL) 2/22/2012  11:15 AM 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 6 
114 
It follows, then, that it is a primary duty of parents to 
nourish this capacity. It does not follow that parents need 
abandon the role of religious mentor and guide (not that it would 
be possible: non-mentoring would itself be a form of mentoring); 
it would hardly be practical, or helpful to children, to adopt some 
ideologically neutral model of parenting.68 In a democracy, 
political theorist William Galston writes, ―parents are entitled to 
introduce their children to what they regard as vital sources of 
meaning and value, and to hope that their children will come to 
share this orientation.‖69  For many, the most vital source of 
meaning and value is their religious faith, and it should go 
without saying that parents may introduce their children to what 
they regard as spiritually true, and to hope that their children 
will come to share a similar religious orientation. 
But this simple proposition raises surprisingly tough 
questions about the parent-child relationship. Parents may 
introduce their children to vital sources of meaning, but what 
limits, if any, can be placed on this introduction?  Parents may 
hope that their children will come to share their values, but how 
far can parents go to make this hope a reality?  If, as it seems, 
 
short, a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of its 
members to choose.‖). 
 68. Cf. Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of 
Orthodoxy”: Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 16 
(1987) (―The image of an individual unimpeded by any preconditioning . . . is a 
fiction.  People acquire their values because of innumerable influences upon 
their lives: the influence of parents; of the family church; of the schools they 
were required to attend; of their relatives, friends, and neighbors; of writers; 
and of many others.  By thus being indoctrinated into society the individual 
obtains the frame of reference necessary for actively making decisions, rather 
than passively receiving impulses.‖). The same reasoning applies to the state as 
educator. Cf. Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and 
Religious Freedom:  A Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in DEMOCRACY‘S PLACE 
137, 160 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1996) (―Even if it were somehow possible for an 
educational regime to abstain from inculcating values in the child, this would 
not be sensible; for the vacuum left by abstaining educators would be filled by 
other causal influences . . . . At any rate, the phenomenon of choice of values by 
an individual, which we associate with attainment of autonomy, always 
presupposes a context in which some standards and values are at least 
provisionally fixed and guide choice.‖). 
 69. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE 
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 105 (2002). 
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Galston writes with some caution, there is good reason for it, 
because, as he also observes, children have freestanding 
intellectual and moral claims of their own, claims that ―imply 
enforceable rights of exit from the boundaries of community 
defined by their parents.‖70  If not the mere creature of the 
state,71 the child is more than a placid reflection of the parental 
image.  In a liberal democracy, the care of children resides first 
in the parents, but not first and last. 
If children have a right to leave behind the boundaries set by 
their parents, then they must be able to exercise that right freely.  
They must not be disempowered from making their own 
intellectual and moral claims in the first place.72  What must be 
 
 70. Id. at 104 (―At a minimum, the children‘s freestanding religious claims 
imply enforceable rights of exit from the boundaries of community defined by 
their parents.  I would add that the exit rights must be more than formal.  
Communities cannot rightly act in ways that disempower individuals—
intellectually, emotionally, or practically—from living successfully outside their 
bounds.‖).  On exit rights within intimate relationships, see also SUSAN MOLLER 
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 136–38 (1989). 
 71. See Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (―The 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only.  The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.‖); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (―In order to 
submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males 
at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to 
official guardians.  Although such measures have been deliberately approved by 
men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and 
State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it 
hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon 
the people of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the 
Constitution.‖). 
 72. The idea that the child‘s capacity to form dissenting beliefs should be 
protected from ideological coercion by state actors finds broad support from 
First Amendment theorists. On the First Amendment and the protection of 
belief formation as well as expression, see, for example, Ingber, supra note 68, 
at 16 (―To allow officials to inculcate values is to admit that free speech protects 
expression only so long as the speaker has been conditioned to say what those 
in authority accept.  In a society of such preconditioned speakers, freedom of 
speech is virtually irrelevant.‖); Nadine Strossen, “Secular Humanism” and 
“Scientific Creationism”: Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular 
Decisions Affecting Students’ Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 370 
(1986) (―A second reason why the minds of public school students should be 
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protected is the child‘s future right to make those claims; what 
must be secured is the child‘s present opportunity to develop the 
capacity to make those claims.73  Ideally, it would be part of the 
parent‘s task to safeguard the child‘s right to moral autonomy; 
but where the transmission of religious belief is involved, it is 
acceptable for parents to enforce spiritual conformity from their 
children, demanding (often in a loving and compassionate voice) 
uncritical obedience toward religious authority.  It is only natural 
for parents to want a child to embrace their values, to believe 
their beliefs, and the legal system, as it ought, leaves parents 
free to transmit their religious values; but parents abuse that 
freedom when they give children no real opportunity to embrace 
other values and to believe other beliefs. 
Young children lack the capacity to assert, or to choose not to 
assert, a personal religious identity.  Those who mentor a child, 
therefore, assume a fiduciary duty to protect his or her 
 
especially shielded from governmental influence is that, due to their youth, the 
students are relatively impressionable and susceptible.  Consequently, to 
maintain the integrity of the process by which public school students form their 
own beliefs, it is especially important to insulate them from any potentially 
coercive governmental influence.  Society has a significant stake in preserving 
the free minds of its youth, because it depends upon them to defend and 
maintain this country‘s democratic, civil libertarian institutions and 
traditions.‖) (footnotes omitted); Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional 
Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 261 
(1983) (―[I]t would make a mockery of the protection of an adult‘s freedom of 
belief if the government could pre-condition his beliefs by indoctrinating him 
during childhood.‖); Arons & Lawrence III, supra note 29, at 312 (―Free 
expression makes unfettered formulation of beliefs and opinions possible.  In 
turn, free formulation of beliefs and opinions is a necessary precursor to 
freedom of expression . . . . The more the government regulates formation of 
beliefs so as to interfere with personal consciousness, the fewer people can 
conceive dissenting ideas or perceive contradictions between self-interest and 
government-sustained ideological orthodoxy.  If freedom of expression protected 
only communication of ideas, totalitarianism and freedom of expression could be 
characteristics of the same society.‖). 
 73. See Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE 
CHILD?: CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). But see, e.g., Shelley Burtt, The 
Proper Scope of Parental Authority:  Why We Don’t Owe Children an “Open 
Future,” in CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 243 (Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion 
Young eds., 2003); Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A 
Defense of Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 847–52 (1999). 
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prospective religious autonomy.74  This caretaking is no easy 
task.  Parents may find it troublesome enough when a child does 
not live by their political or cultural values.  But the questioning 
or outright rejection of parental religious values is likely to 
occasion a more profound disappointment.  Religious principles 
are dictates that run deeper than politics and culture.  
Nonetheless, religious freedom for the parent ought not to come 
at the cost of spiritual servitude for the child, and courts ought 
not to treat parental rights as though they could be divorced from 
parental duties.75  Like adults, children must be free to seek, as 
 
 74. Cf. Ira C. Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation 
of Powers, 67 B.U. L. REV. 971, 976–77 (1987) (―The legal tradition of 
authorizing parents to speak for their offspring need not become a device by 
which children are made to disappear.  Children, not fully competent to make 
decisions because of insufficient awareness of the decisions‘ long-term 
consequences, are normally subject to parental control.  Parents are 
presumptively trustworthy decisionmakers for their children because parents 
generally feel affection for their young and are knowledgeable about their 
interests. Custodial power of this sort is never absolute, however, for it is based 
on a theory of fiduciary obligation.  If the custodian mistreats his ward, public 
or private remedies designed to protect the child may be available.‖) (footnotes 
omitted). On the same principle, see JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. 
CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS 62–101 (1998) (arguing that the law should grant parents a 
legal privilege to care for children only in ways consistent with their best 
temporal interests); Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 68, at 138 (―[T]he 
relationship between parents and children is best thought of as one of 
trusteeship.‖); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Out of Children’s Needs, Children’s 
Rights: The Child’s Voice in Defining the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 321 (1994) 
(urging reform of family rights discourse by making children‘s needs the basis of 
parental authority); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993) 
(considering how a parental rights orientation undermines the nurturing values 
necessary to children‘s welfare). See generally Jeffrey Shulman, The Parent as 
(Mere) Educational Trustee:  Whose Education Is It, Anyway?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 
290 (2010); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 2401 (1995). But see THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD 61 
(1996) (―[P]arenthood as stewardship still has its shortcomings as a model for 
parent-child relations.  As a description of a relationship, it connotes 
disinterestedness, selflessness, a sort of benign but emotionally distant concern 
for the welfare of the child. This fits poorly with the intensity, love, and 
intimacy we prize between parents and children.‖). 
 75. Cf. James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare:  
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1389 (1994) 
(noting that court decisions subsequent to Yoder ―have continued to advance an 
interpretation of free exercise rights that effectively treats children as non-
consenting instruments or means to the achievement of other persons‘ ends, 
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well as to find, a spiritual home.76 
 
rather than as persons in their own right, with interests of their own that are 
deserving of equal respect‖).  For a parentalist point of view, see, for example, 
Karen Gushta, Should Big Brother Shape Your Child’s Soul?, STOP THE WAR 
ON CHILDREN (April 8, 2011, 7:32 AM), http://stopthewaronchildren.wordpress. 
com/2011/04/08/should-big-brother-shape-your-child%E2%80%99s-soul/ 
(―[T]here are those who want to take away the right of custodial parents to 
determine what influences and ideas their children should be exposed to.  This 
is the heart of education, which by definition is intended, directed learning.  
The issue at stake is not ‗who owns the soul of the child,‘ but who has the right 
to shape it.‖). 
 76. Cf. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:  Sources, Thoughts and 
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & Feminism 7, 10–11 (1989): 
To become autonomous is to come to be able to find and live in 
accordance with one‘s own law. 
*** 
I speak of ―becoming‖ autonomous because I think it is not a 
quality one can simply posit about human beings.  We must develop 
and sustain the capacity for finding our own law, and the task is to 
understand what social forms, relationships, and personal practices 
foster that capacity.  I use the word ―find‖ to suggest that we do not 
make or even exactly choose our own law.  The idea of ―finding‖ one‘s 
law is true to the belief that even what is truly one‘s own law is 
shaped by the society in which one lives and the relationships that are 
a part of one‘s life.  ―Finding‖ also permits an openness to the idea 
that one‘s own law is revealed by spiritual sources, that our capacity 
to find a law within us comes from our spiritual nature.  From both 
perspectives, the law is one‘s own in the deepest sense, but not made 
by the individual; the individual develops it, but in connection with 
others; it is not chosen, but recognized.  ―One‘s own law‖ connotes 
values, limits, order, even commands just as the more conventional 
use of the term does.  But these values and demands come from within 
each person rather than being imposed from without.  The idea that 
there are commands that one recognizes as one‘s own, requirements 
that constrain one‘s life, but come from the meaning or purpose of that 
life, captures the basic connection between law and freedom—which is 
perhaps the essence of the concept of autonomy.  The necessary social 
dimension of the vision I am sketching comes from the insistence, 
first, that the capacity to find one‘s own law can develop only in the 
context of relations with others (both intimate and more broadly 
social) that nurture this capacity, and second, that the ―content‖ of 
one‘s own law is comprehensible only with reference to shared social 
norms, values, and concepts. 
(footnotes omitted); WILLIAM J. SHEARER, THE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING OF 
CHILDREN 269 (1904) (―We must not forget that the great object of training is 
not merely to make children obedient.  It is not to make them behave.  It is not 
to keep them quiet.  It is not to make them admired by others . . . . The great 
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Compelled religious belief is an affront to the child‘s dignity 
and worth. When children are forced to believe, they are 
required, by the dictates of someone else‘s conscience, to forego 
the intellectual openness that ―plays a vital role in the process of 
becoming an autonomous individual.‖77  Such disrespect for the 
child can only beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness.78  Yet we 
permit parents to impose a presumed religious identity upon a 
child without the child‘s consent or understanding.  We permit 
religious parents to raise and educate their children                          
in ideologically segregated enclaves.  We permit parents to 
inculcate religious beliefs contrary to their children‘s declared 
preferences.79  Under the mantle of rights—parental rights, 
rights of religious freedom, or the especially potent combination 
of the two—we so circumscribe the child‘s spiritual autonomy 
that, for many children, the freedom to choose or not to choose 
religious belief comes to exist more in principle than in fact.80 
In his ―parentalist manifesto,‖ Stephen Gilles allows that the 
 
purpose of training is to make out of each what the Almighty evidently intended 
him to be.  What He intended is not always an easy matter to determine.  The 
only way it can be determined is by carefully studying the peculiarities of each 
mind, heart and body with which every child is gifted.‖). 
 77. John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 
321, 346–49 (1979).  Garvey identifies four ways in which free speech performs 
an instrumental role in the child‘s growth toward autonomy:  (1) ―by permitting 
the individual to experience the satisfaction that results from self-expression‖; 
(2) by ―offering occasions for practice in skills of rational discourse‖; (3) by 
―showing the young the potential of speech to accomplish good or bad results‖; 
and (4) by ―allowing receipt of information important for the child‘s 
development.‖  Id. 
 78. See Jefferson, supra note 30, at xvii; cf. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and 
Good Character:  From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY 
VIGILANT:  FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61–95 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey 
R. Stone eds., 2002) (arguing that the protection of expressive liberty nurtures 
character traits instrumental to the pursuit of social objectives). 
 79. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(―Moreover, even if the children had expressed a personal religious identity it is 
not clear that the children would have had any constitutional right to resist, or 
to be protected from, attempts by either parent to exercise their constitutional 
rights to inculcate religious beliefs in them contrary to their declared 
preferences prior to their legal emancipation.‖). 
 80. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969) (―Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to 
be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact.‖). 
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state has a duty to protect children from all forms of educational 
coercion. 
The same goal—ensuring the liberty of individuals—requires 
the state to protect its citizens . . . .  [N]o one in a liberal society 
may coerce another‘s choice of values or beliefs unless somehow 
privileged to do so.  The baseline for defining coercive behavior 
(or sufficient justifications) may shift as one moves from state 
action to private conduct, but the core principle still holds: in a 
liberal society, all authority is limited, and all coercion 
requires reasoned justification.81 
It might be argued that parental religious mentoring is less 
likely to be injurious than state compulsion, but why should the 
baseline for defining coercive behavior shift as one moves from 
state action to private conduct?  With equal force, it might be 
argued that coercion is likely to be more effective, and the injury 
it inflicts deeper, when the child is compelled to believe by those 
closest to him.  Children are no less captive to private 
educators—all the more so when cut off from ideas contrary to 
those of home or community; and religious mentorship presents a 
specially effective form of force, bringing with it, as it does, the 
imprimatur of divine authority and the specter of divine 
disapproval. 
The state that protects the freedom of adults to choose a 
religious (or non-religious) path must also ensure that the 
freedom of children to choose a religious (or non-religious) path 
will not be taken from them.  The dictates of conscience are as 
compelling to the child (and future adult) as they are for the 
parent.  Indeed, the commitment to individual choice may be the 
best guarantee of a society with rich and robust religious 
traditions.  Children are natural religious seekers.  As young 
adults, some will choose new spiritual paths, and some will 
choose to abandon religious ways altogether; but many will find 
their faith in traditional places, arriving where they started.  For 
religious freedom to flourish, however, these choices must be 
genuine ones, based on knowledge and experience gathered, as it 
 
 81. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children:  A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 946 (1996). 
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were, ―out of a multitude of tongues,‖ religious and secular. 82  In 
a liberal democracy, the binding power of moral commandments 
depends on individual acceptance.83 This constitutional 
commitment to free choice means at least this: that the state has 
a compelling interest in providing all children the opportunity to 
make the most meaningful choices about the most meaningful 
matters. 
 
 82. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 683 (1967) (quoting United 
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y 1943)); see also 
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372 (―[N]either exclusively, nor even primarily, 
are the interests of the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves 
one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as 
many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is 
possible.  That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the 
interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right 
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.  To many this is, and always will 
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.‖). But see Stanley Fish, Children 
and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. REV. 883, 884 (1997) (―[W]ithout 
‗authoritative selection,‘ education, whether public or private, would be 
impossible.‖). 
 83. See GALSTON, supra note 69, at 28 (maintaining that it is a matter of 
great importance for Jews ―to live in a society that permits them to live in 
accordance with their understanding of an identity that is given rather than 
chosen, and that typically is structured by commandments whose binding power 
does not depend on individual acceptance‖); cf. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
DEMOCRACY‘S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 66–67 
(1996) (―For procedural liberalism . . . the case for religious liberty derives not 
from the moral importance of religion but from the need to protect individual 
autonomy; government should be neutral toward religion for the same reason it 
should be neutral toward competing conceptions of the good life generally—to 
respect people‘s capacity to choose their own values and ends.  But despite its 
liberating promise, or perhaps because of it, this broader mission depreciates 
the claims of those for whom religion is not an expression of autonomy but a 
matter of conviction unrelated to a choice.  Protecting religion as a life-style, as 
one among the values that an independent self may have, may miss the role 
that religion plays in the lives of those for whom the observance of religious 
duties is a constitutive end, essential to their good and indispensable to their 
identity.‖). But cf., e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985) (―[T]he 
Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience 
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious 
faith or none at all.  This conclusion derives support not only from the interest 
in respecting the individual‘s freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction 
that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary 
choice by the faithful . . . .‖). 
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IV. THE MORAL PERSONHOOD OF THE CHILD 
For the Yoder majority, mandatory secondary schooling was 
objectionable because it would take Amish adolescents ―away 
from their community, physically and emotionally, during the 
crucial and formative adolescent period of life.‖84  In what sense, 
then, did the Court consider this period crucial and formative?  It 
is during this period, the Court says, that the children ―must 
acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance 
and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an 
Amish farmer or housewife.‖85  During this period, children ―must 
learn to enjoy physical labor.‖86  During this period, ―the Amish 
child must also grow in his faith and his relationship to the 
Amish community if he is to be prepared to accept the heavy 
obligations imposed by adult baptism.‖87  For the Amish child, 
the adolescent period is crucial and formative not in the sense 
that the child is forming his or her identity; rather, the child 
labors under a number of ―musts,‖ all of which are crucial if the 
child is to conform successfully to communal religious traditions.  
The Yoder decision turns upside-down the nature of adolescence, 
ignoring what is really important about this stage of 
development—the increasing independence from adult 
guidance;88 the defining of a self by reference to new ideas and by 
association with unlike peers;89 the preparation for intelligent 
participation in the democratic process;90 even the adolescent‘s 
 
 84. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88. Cf. Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 68, at 172 (―[T]he Amish defendants 
themselves seemed to have a lively appreciation of the fact that early 
adolescence is a crucial period for defining one‘s identity and one‘s relation to 
the values taught as authoritative in one‘s childhood.  If the development of 
children‘s minds from ages fourteen to sixteen is not consequential, what is the 
fuss about?‖). 
 89. See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of 
Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1270–
73 (2000) (describing the importance of peer interaction in adolescent identity 
formation). 
 90. The idea that the classroom is the seedbed of democratic virtues is one 
of our most enduring national themes.  See generally, e.g., EAMONN CALLAN, 
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own quest for spiritual meaning91—and consigns the young adult 
to a life of ―idiosyncratic separateness.‖92  (It was no mean feat of 
legal analysis for the Court to find that the ―limitations‖ 
accompanying the Amish way of life are ―self-imposed.‖93) 
In general, the Supreme Court sees the liberty interests of 
the parent and child as ―inextricably linked.‖94  The child is not, 
however, without independent constitutional standing to 
challenge deprivations of educational opportunity.95  Though the 
Supreme Court has seen the need to act ―with sensitivity and 
flexibility to the special needs of parents and children,‖96 it is 
undisputed that ―whatever may be their precise impact, neither 
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone.‖97  And with respect to many due process claims, the Court 
has concluded ―that the child‘s right is virtually coextensive with 
that of an adult.‖98  Even against parents, the child is not beyond 
the protection of the Constitution. 99  Indeed, the due process 
 
CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997); 
LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 1607–
1783 415–71 (1970); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); STEPHEN 
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL 
DEMOCRACY (2000). 
 91. On children‘s religious development, see generally ROBERT COLES, THE 
SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN (1990); JAMES W. FOWLER, STAGES OF FAITH:  THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE QUEST FOR MEANING (1981); 
CHRISTIAN SMITH & MELINDA LUNDQUIST DENTON, SOUL SEARCHING:  THE 
RELIGIOUS AND SPIRITUAL LIVES OF AMERICAN TEENAGERS (2005); THE HANDBOOK 
OF SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE (Eugene C. 
Roehlkepartain et al. eds., 2006); Note, Children as Believers: Minors’ Free 
Exercise Rights and the Psychology of Religious Development, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2205, 2220–25 (2002). 
 92. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226. 
 93. Id. at 225. 
 94. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). 
 95. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1975); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
 96. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); cf. May v. Anderson, 345 
U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (―Children have a very special 
place in life which law should reflect.  Legal theories and their phrasing in 
other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to 
determination of a State‘s duty towards children.‖). 
 97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
 98. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
 99. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.  State constitutions may provide even 
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protections from which the right to parent arises also work on 
behalf of the child‘s independent educational interests.  Thus, the 
Court has read Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
as protecting children against state efforts to enforce intellectual 
homogeneity.100  It is the child‘s due process rights that, in part, 
explain why ―state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism.‖101 
Students in school as well as out of school are ―persons‖ under 
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights 
which the State must respect, just as they themselves must 
respect their obligations to the State.  In our system, students 
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that 
which the State chooses to communicate.  They may not be 
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are 
officially approved.102 
The law of parent-child relations accepts as a starting point 
the longstanding legal presumptions (1) that ―parents possess 
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for 
judgment required for making life‘s difficult decisions,‖ and (2) 
that ―natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children.‖103  The Court has had numerous 
opportunities to test the currency of these legal presumptions.  In 
Parham v. J.R, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
mental health laws permitting parents to admit children to 
hospitals for treatment.104  On behalf of the children, it was 
argued that 
the constitutional rights of the child are of such magnitude and 
the likelihood of parental abuse is so great that the parents‘ 
traditional interests in and responsibility for the upbringing of 
 
greater protection.  See Paul L. Tractenberg, Education Provisions in State 
Constitutions: A Summary of a Chapter for the State Constitutions for the 
Twenty-First Century Project, Rutgers Shool of Law—Camden, http://camlaw. 
rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/tractenberg.pdf. (last visited February 3, 2012). 
 100. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 
(1969). 
 101. Id. at 511. 
 102. Id. at 511. 
 103. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979). 
 104. Id. at 584. 
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their child must be subordinated at least to the extent of 
providing a formal adversary hearing prior to a voluntary 
commitment.105 
But the Court thought that this argument swept too broadly. 
Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a 
child or because it involves risks does not automatically 
transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to 
some agency or officer of the state.  The same characterizations 
can be made for a tonsillectomy, appendectomy, or other 
medical procedure.  Most children, even in adolescence, simply 
are not able to make sound judgments concerning many 
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.  
Parents can and must make those judgments . . . . We cannot 
assume that the result in Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters would have been different if the children 
there had announced a preference to learn only English or a 
preference to go to a public, rather than a church, school.  The 
fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or complain about 
a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not 
diminish the parents‘ authority to decide what is best for the 
child.106 
The Court rejected the ―statist notion that governmental 
power should supersede parental authority in all cases because 
some parents abuse and neglect children . . . .‖107  Absent 
evidence that rebuts the traditional presumptions in favor of 
parental control, parents retain ―a substantial, if not the 
dominant, role in the [commitment] decision.‖108  Still, the Court 
did not walk away from the interests of children, adding that ―the 
child‘s rights and the nature of the commitment decision are such 
that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable 
discretion to decide whether to have a child institutionalized.‖109  
The Court walked a careful line between the interests of child 
and parent, and it noted that ―experience and reality may rebut 
 
 105. Id. at 602. 
 106. Id. at 603–04 (citations omitted). 
 107. Id. at 603. 
 108. Id. at 604. 
 109. Id. 
SHULMAN (FINAL) 2/22/2012  11:15 AM 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 6 
126 
what the law accepts as a starting point . . . .‖110 
Sometimes, experience and reality do rebut legal 
presumptions.  The liberty interests of children and parents are 
not always compatible; there will be points of collision where the 
protection of children‘s needs and rights has to come at the cost 
of parental authority.  This is often the case, for instance, in the 
area of medical decision-making.  The law generally pays homage 
to the medical choices that parents make for their children, but 
in some circumstances minors can get care without their parents‘ 
consent, and, in fact, without their parents‘ knowledge.111  In 
many states, unemancipated minors are allowed by law to 
consent to treatment for substance abuse, for venereal disease 
(including testing for HIV and sexually transmitted diseases), 
and counseling for mental health problems, sexual abuse, and 
family planning.112  Minors can get birth control, including 
prescription contraceptives, without parental consent or 
notification; a pregnant minor may consent to prenatal care as 
well as labor and delivery services.113  Information about these 
medical services remains confidential.114  And where statutory 
protection is lacking, the mature minor doctrine may operate to 
shield the child‘s medical decision-making rights from the 
religious beliefs of his or her parents.115 
It is true that there are practical concerns at work here.  The 
worry is that parents will object to these services, thus 
discouraging adolescents from seeking treatment important to 
their health and to the welfare of society as a whole.  So, to 
protect these interests, legislators have provided minors with 
what amounts to a parental bypass option.116  But to cast these 
 
 110. Id. at 602. 
 111. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for 
Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 416–22 (2002). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 418–19. 
 114. Id.; see also Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 269–70 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting federal 
law to extend confidentiality to minors‘ consent for reproductive services). 
 115. On the evolution of the mature minor doctrine, see, for example, 
Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical 
Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 144–52 (2000). 
 116. Id.; see also Hartman, supra note 111, at 416–22. 
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decisions as medical, not ethical—itself a value-laden judgment—
too easily dismisses the moral and religious concerns of parents.  
The truth is that the state has wrested control from parents over 
some of a young person‘s most intimate and morally problematic 
personal decisions. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has applied a mature minor 
doctrine to the most value-laden of medical decisions.  The legal 
struggle to guarantee a woman‘s right to terminate a pregnancy 
has put the Court squarely in the business of defining the 
allocation of moral authority between parent and child.  In 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court 
held (among other things) that the state could not justify 
legislation that required a minor to obtain the consent of a 
parent as a condition for abortion during the first trimester. 117  
The Court made the customary nod toward Meyer, Pierce, and 
Yoder, but finally rejected chronological age as a constitutional 
yardstick by which to measure whether a minor can 
independently make the abortion decision: ―Constitutional rights 
do not mature and come into being magically only when one 
attains the state-defined age of majority.  Minors, as well as 
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess 
constitutional rights.‖118 
On this doctrinal platform, the Court held that ―the 
safeguarding of the family and of parental authority‖ was not a 
state interest sufficiently significant to justify conditioning the 
minor‘s access to abortion on parental consent.119  In Bellotti v. 
Baird, the Court struck down a law that required a minor 
seeking an abortion to either (1) obtain the consent of her 
parents, or (2) notify them of any proceedings by which the minor 
sought to obtain judicial consent for an abortion.120  The Bellotti 
Court did its best not to challenge the core presumptions 
governing the relations of parent and child.  Typically, the Court 
 
 117. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 118. Id. at 74. 
 119. Id. at 75; cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int‘l, 431 U.S. 678, 719 (1977) 
(declaring that a state may not use police power to enforce its concept of public 
morality as it pertains to minors). 
 120. 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979). 
SHULMAN (FINAL) 2/22/2012  11:15 AM 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 6 
128 
made the point that there were several good reasons why the 
state may reasonably limit a minor‘s freedom to make 
independently ―important, affirmative choices with potentially 
serious consequences.‖121  In the context of abortion, however, 
none of these reasons was reason enough to require parental 
notification.  The Court based its decision on the unique nature of 
the abortion decision.122  Unlike countless other decisions (like 
the decision to marry, for example), the abortion decision cannot 
be postponed; unlike few other situations, the consequences of 
denying a minor the right to make this decision would be ―grave 
and indelible.‖123 Given what the Court described as the 
―profound moral and religious concerns‖ associated with the 
abortion decision,124 it would be unrealistic to think that some 
parents would not make (all too emphatically) clear their 
objection to the minor‘s decision. 
[M]any parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, 
and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, 
are particularly vulnerable to their parents‘ efforts to obstruct 
both an abortion and their access to court.  It would be 
unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a 
legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective 
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.125 
In this context, the Court seems to have accepted the ―statist 
notion that governmental power should supersede parental 
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect 
children . . . .‖126  The presumption that parents act in the best 
interests of their children has been reversed.  Or, perhaps, the 
presumption is meaningless when there is no way to agree about 
where the child‘s best interests lie.  The unique nature of the 
abortion decision cuts both ways.  The child may focus on the fact 
that the decision cannot be postponed; the parent may focus on 
the fact that the decision cannot be undone. That the 
 
 121. Id. at 635. 
 122. Id. at 442–44. 
 123. Id. at 642. 
 124. Id. at 640. 
 125. Id. at 647. 
 126. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
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consequences of the decision are grave and indelible would strike 
many as more reason for parents to be involved.  Regardless of 
one‘s position on abortion, it is difficult not to conclude that the 
Supreme Court‘s abortion jurisprudence has changed the 
landscape of parent-child relations.  If minors can make a 
decision as profound as whether to terminate a pregnancy, why 
should courts presume that parents possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for 
making life‘s other difficult decisions? 
In its position on the reproductive rights of minors, the Court 
is clearly attentive to the limits of parental authority, but there 
is also at work a deeper concern about the personhood of the 
prospective mother. The abortion cases rest in part on the 
fundamental ―moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not 
to others nor to society as a whole.‖127  Of course, other ―facts‖ of 
human nature work against atomistic theories of personhood and 
social relations, but surely Kenneth L. Karst is correct enough 
when he asserts that ―freedom of associational choice enhances 
the values of intimate association to a degree that would not be 
attainable if choice were absent.‖128  As children mature, they 
enter into a host of intimate associations, the value of which very 
much depends on the child‘s freedom of choice.  We might even 
say that the child will have to choose whether or not to identify 
with his or her parents and ―to be committed to maintaining a 
caring intimacy with them.‖129  But the decision to choose one‘s 
parents, so to speak, is meaningful only if it is a free one, only, 
that is, if the maturing child enjoys the freedom to choose not to 
make that association (or, at least, not to make it an intimate 
one).  As Karst writes, the full value of commitment can be 
measured ―only when there is freedom to remain uncommitted . . 
. . [C]oerced intimate associations are the most repugnant of all 
forms of compulsory association.‖130  This is not just the case with 
 
 127. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, 
Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288–89 (1977). 
 128. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE. L.J. 
624, 637 (1980). 
 129. Id. at 644. 
 130. Id. at 637–38. 
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intimate associations, however; it is (again, Karst) ―equally 
applicable to associations that are primarily ideological.‖131  It 
hardly needs to be added that coerced religious association is 
repugnant in ways both intimate and ideological. 
Frieda Yoder was fifteen years old when she testified that 
religious beliefs guided her decision to discontinue school 
attendance.132  Lillian Gobitis was not yet a teenager when the 
court heard her objection to compulsory patriotic rituals.133  And 
Betty Simmons was only nine years old when she testified that 
street preaching was a religious duty.134  The courts should be no 
less reluctant to hear from children when they choose not to 
follow the religious preferences of their parents, when there are, 
as Justice Douglas put it, ―potentially conflicting desires.‖135  
When parent and child agree, it will not always be easy to 
determine if the child is speaking freely.  When parent and child 
disagree, it will not always be easy to determine whether the 
child is sufficiently mature to make decisions about religious 
identity.  But these are matters with which courts are familiar 
enough.  The reality is that children can be coerced by not being 
heard as surely as they can by being forced to utter what is not in 
their minds.  If the child belongs to herself, she may not be made 
a means by which parents perpetuate their own moral mandates 
 
 131. Id. at 638; see also Alan B. Kalin, Comment, The Right of Ideological 
Nonassociation, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 767 (1978).  And, we might add, freedom of 
choice is equally applicable to associations that are primarily vocational. See 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239–40 (1972)  (White, J., concurring) (―It is 
possible that most Amish children will wish to continue living the rural life of 
their parents, in which case their training at home will adequately equip them 
for their future role. Others, however, may wish to become nuclear physicists, 
ballet dancers, computer programmers, or historians, and for these occupations, 
formal training will be necessary.‖); see also id. at 244–45 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (―While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire 
family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have 
decided views.  He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an 
oceanographer.‖). 
 132. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 n.1 (1972). 
 133. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591(1940). 
 134. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944). 
 135. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (―Where the child is mature enough to 
express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child‘s 
rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.‖). 
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or preferences; she may not be held hostage to religious 
tradition.136 Before the full moral personhood of the child, the 
right to parent, even when joined to a claim of religious liberty, 
must give way. 
William Galston, among others, describes parenting as a 
 
 136. For instance: 
The slave-master may withhold education and the Bible; he 
may forbid religious instruction, and access to public 
worship.  He may enforce upon the slave and his family a 
religious worship and a religious teaching which he 
disapproves.  In all this, as completely as in secular matters, 
he is ―entirely subject to the will of the master, to whom he 
belongs.‖  The claim of chattelhood extends to the soul as 
well as to the body, for the body cannot be otherwise held 
and controlled . . . . There is no other religious despotism on 
the face of the earth so absolute, so irresponsible, so soul-
crushing as this. 
WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:   ITS 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND 
ILLUSTRATIVE FACTS 235 (1853) (emphasis added). Compre the above regulation 
with, for example, Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: 
Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1200–05 
(1997) (―A religion, then, is not a static thing, existing at a particular place and 
time.  It is, or rather, it aspires to be at once elusive and evolutionary, existing 
in more than one time.  A religion, in this view, is a story that a people (not a 
person) tells itself about its historical relationship to God.  One reason our 
contemporary constitutional law tends to miss this point is that it tends to view 
religion as a matter of individual choice rather than as a community activity; 
but serious religions revolve around the group, not the individual . . . . A 
religion survives through tradition, and tradition is multigenerational. A 
religion that fails to extend itself over time is, in this vision, not a religion at all.  
It might be a set of moral beliefs or a collection of folk tales or a nifty theological 
idea or a list of interesting rules, but, if it does not exist in this timeless, 
evolutionary fashion, the one thing it is not is a religion.‖); George W. Dent, Jr., 
Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 707, 738 (1993) (―The communitarian tradition is especially 
relevant to the religion clauses because the survival of religious communities is 
necessary to make the religious freedom of individuals ‗both possible and 
meaningful.‘  The education of children is crucial to this survival.  People are 
mortal, but humanity (we hope) is not.  To survive, religious groups depend on 
raising their members‘ children within the faith.  Although government may 
not act affirmatively to preserve any particular religious group or religion 
generally, religious freedom permits, and to some extent requires, government 
to forbear from unnecessarily weakening religious communities.  When public 
schools undermine a sect without a compelling need to do so, the state should 
offer reasonable accommodation to children of the sect.‖). 
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form of expressive liberty.137  By expressive liberty, he means 
―the absence of constraints imposed by some individuals or 
groups on others that make it impossible or significantly more 
difficult for the affected individuals or groups to live their lives in 
ways that express their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning 
and value to life.‖138  Galston adds that ―[n]ot all sets of practices 
will themselves rest on, or reflect a preference for, liberty as 
ordinarily understood . . . . Expressive liberty protects the ability 
of individuals and groups to live in ways that others would 
regard as unfree.‖139  For Galston, then, the expressive interests 
of parents ―are not reducible to their fiduciary duty to promote 
their children‘s interests.‖140  But does the expressive liberty of 
 
 137. GALSTON, supra note 69, at 101–02, 109 (―[T]he ability of parents to 
raise their children in a manner consistent with their deepest commitments is 
an essential element of expressive liberty.‖); see also DAVID WILLIAM ARCHARD, 
CHILDREN, FAMILY AND THE STATE 96 (2003) (―Being a parent is extremely 
important to a person.  Even if a child is not to be thought of as the property or 
even as an extension of the parent, the shared life of a parent and child involves 
an adult‘s purposes and aims at the deepest level . . . . [P]arents have an 
interest in parenting—that is, in sharing a life with, and directing the 
development of, their child.  It is not enough to discount the interests of a 
parent in a moral theory of parenthood.  What must also merit full and proper 
consideration is the interest of someone in being a parent.‖); Colin M. Macleod, 
Conceptions of Parental Autonomy, 25 POLITICS AND SOCIETY 117, 119 (1997) 
(―[T]hose who accept the responsibility of raising children frequently do so 
because the project of creating and raising a family is an important, indeed 
often fundamental, element of their own life plans. Viewed from this 
perspective, parents cannot be seen as mere guardians of their children‘s 
interests.  They are also people for whom creating a family is a project from 
which they may derive substantial value.  They have an interest in the family 
as a vehicle through which some of their own distinctive commitments and 
convictions can be realized and perpetuated.‖); Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 
68, at 151 (―As the discharge of parental obligations allows wide scope for 
parental discretion, choosing and pursuing a child-rearing regimen is for many 
parents an important mode of self-expression and personal creativity.‖). 
 138. GALSTON, supra note 69, at 101. 
 139. Id. at 29. 
 140. Id. at 103; cf. CALLAN, supra note 90, at 144–45 (―We do not experience 
the rearing of a child merely as unilateral service on behalf of a separate human 
life; we experience it as the sharing of a life and a cardinal source of self-
fulfillment.  The child-centered strategy, when it purports to be the whole moral 
truth about parenthood, flies in the face of our ordinary understanding of what 
rearing a child signifies because it does not accommodate the task‘s momentous 
expressive significance in parents‘ lives.  By the ‗expressive significance‘ of 
child-rearing I mean the way in which raising a child engages our deepest 
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parents include the right to force children to live in unfree 
ways?141  Here, Galston agrees with Eamonn Callan‘s critique of 
parenting that leads children to a life of ethical servility.  ―As a 
parent,‖ Galston writes (quoting Callan), ―I cannot rightly mold 
my child‘s character in a way that effectively preempts ‗serious 
thought at any future date about the alternatives to my 
judgment.‘‖142  The child, too, has an interest in expressive 
liberty, though a prospective one, ―that parents cannot 
undermine.‖143 
No doubt, the expressive interests of parents can be pushed 
too far.  The question is: How far is too far?  No doubt, children, 
dependent as they are, rely on parental direction to establish a 
sense of self and place in the world.  But a healthy respect for the 
proper boundaries of parental authority does not mean that 
children ought to be used as the vehicle of adult religious 
expression.144 We would all agree (wouldn‘t we?) that the 
 
values and yearnings so that we are tempted to think of the child‘s life as a 
virtual extension of our own . . . . No one would now deny that if a moral theory 
interprets the child‘s role so as to make individual children no more than 
instruments of their parents‘ good it would be open to damning moral 
objections.  But parallel objections must be decisive against any theory that 
interprets the parent‘s role in ways that make individual parents no more than 
instruments of their children‘s good.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 141. See WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES:  GOODS, VIRTUES, AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 253 (1991) (objecting to conclusion that ―the 
state must (or may) structure public education to foster skeptical reflection on 
ways of life inherited from parents or local communities‖). But see Anne C. 
Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 484 (2006) (―A developmental 
approach [to caregiving] does rule out the possibility that a commitment to 
democratic citizenship is compatible with depriving children of the means by 
which to choose whether to accept or reject family beliefs or practices. The 
unexamined life—a life premised on faith rather than reason—is a perfectly 
acceptable choice for adult citizens, but foreclosing children from eventually 
making that choice for themselves is not compatible with democratic principles 
or the maintenance of a democratic constitutional polity. A developmental 
perspective sets some outer limits on the extent to which communities of faith 
may sustain themselves by depriving children of the opportunity for acquiring 
the skills of democratic citizenship.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 142. GALSTON, supra note 69, at 105 (quoting CREATING CITIZENS:  POLITICAL 
EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY152–54 (1997)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Cf. Martha L. A. Fineman, Taking Children’s Rights Seriously, in 
CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 240 (Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 
2003) (―The big question is not whether the state must recognize parents‘ 
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expressive interests of parents would not legitimate the ritual 
sacrifice of children.145  Galston appears to require parents to 
hurdle a much higher bar when he proposes that ―parents abuse 
their expressive liberty if . . . they deprive their children of the 
opportunity to exercise their own expressive liberty.‖146  But it 
turns out that the bar is not very high: Galston means that 
parents abuse their expressive liberty ―if they turn their children 
into automatons.‖147  It would be abusive to seal off the outside 
world ―so that children are not even aware of alternatives to the 
group‘s way of life.‖148  Thus, for Galston, Yoder is a correct 
decision.  It protects the expressive liberty of Amish parents 
without depriving Amish children of the opportunity to exercise 
their own expressive liberty.  After all, he observes, ―the Amish 
community is not a prison.‖149   
Of course, Galston knows that parents can undermine the 
expressive liberty of children without turning them into 
automatons.  The narcissistic parent can create a regime of filial 
obedience so rigid that children cannot fairly consider the 
alternatives of which they are aware.  Galston writes that ―[t]he 
nonexercise of a justified claim becomes questionable only when 
the potential claimant is subject to intimidation or is deprived of 
the information and self-confidence required for independent 
judgment.‖150 But is not rejection by home and community always 
 
expressive interest in their children‘s interest, but where we draw the line 
separating that expressive interest from the child’s interest in the diversity and 
independence-conferring potential of a secular and public education.‖); Arneson 
& Shapiro, supra note 68, at 154 (stating that parents ―cannot pretend to speak 
for the child while really regarding the child as an empty vessel for the parents‘ 
own religious convictions‖). 
 145. See GALSTON, supra note 69, at 102 (―No one would seriously argue that 
the expressive liberty of parents would legitimate the ritual sacrifice of their 
children . . . .‖). 
 146. See id. at 105. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 106.  But see Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 68, at 140–41 
(―Although the Amish believe that the vow of baptism must be taken voluntarily 
by a mature person, they go to great lengths in designing their system of 
education and acculturation to ensure that Amish children will take the vow 
and join the church.‖). 
 150. GALSTON, supra note 69, at  105. 
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a form of intimidation?  Is not schooling beyond the eighth grade 
a prerequisite for the information and self-confidence required 
for independent judgment?  Galston notes that ―[s]ubstantial 
numbers‖ of Amish children decide to leave their religious 
community.151  But he fails to note that those who do decide to 
leave face the prospect of being shunned—that is, they exercise a 
justified claim of religious liberty (their freestanding exit right) 
only at the cost of forsaking the only life they know, at the cost of 
being abandoned by home and community.  We ought to remind 
ourselves that the ritual sacrifice of children can take a variety of 
forms. 
V. EDUCATION FOR AN OPEN RELIGIOUS FUTURE 
Few disputes generate the degree of heat or the depth of 
hostility that accompany religious controversy.  When that 
controversy touches the lives of our children, it is often a struggle 
to find room for compromise; it takes nothing less than a leap of 
faith to see compromise as anything less than a violation of one‘s 
conscience.  The religious destiny of our children matters so 
deeply, so personally—it matters so much—that we fight with . . . 
well, with religious fervor.  In our homes, schools, and 
communities, and, of course, in our courts, we fight to control our 
children‘s religious upbringing as though we are (and many truly 
believe they are) fighting for the soul of the child.  Sadly, if 
predictably, it is children who suffer the fallout of 
uncompromising religious conviction. 
Children are poorly served by a legal regime that too readily 
 
 151. Id. at 106. According to Donald Kraybill‘s study of Amish culture, the 
Amish ―retention rate‖ is about eighty-six percent. See Donald B. Kraybill, 
Plotting Social Change Across Four Affiliations, in THE AMISH STRUGGLE WITH 
MODERNITY 73 (Donald B. Kraybill & Marc A Olshan eds., 1994); cf. Macleod, 
supra note 137, at 136 (―[A]lthough entrance into the Amish culture by an 
adolescent is officially a matter of voluntary choice, it is difficult to see such a 
choice as the expression of genuine autonomy.  After all, the ordinary Amish 
adolescent can hardly be said to have an informed opinion about other possible 
life choices and for most of her life has, in effect, been subjected to the will of 
her parents and community.‖). Oddly, Yoder was based on the premise that 
secondary schooling was not needed because the children were being prepared 
―for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish 
faith.‖ Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972). 
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defers to the talismanic invocation of religious parenting rights.  
In this regard, courts should look skeptically at any educational 
program, whether imposed by the parent or by the state, that 
restricts the spectrum of knowledge available to the child.152  To 
see that free choice is not strangled at its source,153  the state 
may not sponsor particular religious beliefs, but that is not 
enough; it must protect its children from being forced to adopt 
religious beliefs; and this obligation, as educational theorist 
Harry Brighouse has pointed out, ―cuts against the differential 
regulation of public and private schools with respect to religious 
instruction.‖154  The state must protect all its children, not just 
those in the public school system.155 
It is the state‘s duty to ensure that all schools, public and 
private, inculcate habits of critical reasoning and reflection, a 
way of thinking that implies a tolerance of and respect for other 
 
 152. Cf. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (―[W]e have held that in a variety of contexts the 
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas . . . .  [T]he right 
to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of 
his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.‖ (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (―[T]he State 
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the 
spectrum of available knowledge.‖). On children‘s intellectual rights, see 
generally David Moshman, Children’s Intellectual Rights:  A First Amendment 
Analysis, in CHILDREN‘S INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 25 (David Moshman ed., 1986); 
Harvey Siegel, Critical Thinking as an Intellectual Right, in CHILDREN‘S 
INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 39 (David Moshman ed., 1986). 
 153. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 154. Harry Brighouse, School Vouchers, Separation of Church and State, 
and Personal Autonomy, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 247 (Stephen 
Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002). 
 155. Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); cf. Bd. of Educ. of 
Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245–46 (1968) (―Since Pierce, a 
substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that 
attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance 
laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ 
teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.  
Indeed, the State‘s interest in assuring that these standards are being met has 
been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept instruction at home as 
compliance with compulsory education statutes.‖); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Ewing. Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (―This Court has said that parents may, in 
the discharge of their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their 
children to a religious rather than a public school if the school meets the secular 
educational requirements which the state has power to impose.‖). 
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points of views.156  To pursue this goal, the state need not make 
public schooling compulsory.157  (Unless Pierce is overruled, it 
could not.)  But it must see that all children are provided an 
education that is, in the fullest sense, public—a schooling that 
gives children the tools they will need to think for themselves by 
making public, as it were, a common intellectual and cultural 
capital; a schooling that takes seriously the idea that both 
autonomy and tolerance require children to know other sources of 
meaning and value than those they bring from home.  This effort 
may well divide child from parent.  Indeed, we should be entirely 
forthright and unapologetic about this: The inculcation of such 
habits is more likely than not to divide child from parent, not 
because socialist educators want to ―submerge‖ our children,158 
but because learning to think for oneself is what children do; it is 
one facet of the overall movement toward separation and 
individuation that is ―growing up,‖ perhaps the most natural and 
vital part of healthy maturation.  Likewise, we should be entirely 
candid about the fact that the inculcation of such intellectual 
habits will be more compatible with the beliefs of some religious 
groups than others.159 
 
 156. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) 
(―These fundamental values of ‗habits and manners of civility‘ essential to a 
democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and 
religious views . . . .‖); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (―These 
perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to 
the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the 
observations of social scientists.‖). 
 157. But see Fineman, supra note 144, at 241 (―Perhaps the most 
appropriate suggestion for our current educational dilemma is that public 
education should be mandatory and universal.‖). 
 158. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (―In order to submerge the 
individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into 
barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official 
guardians.  Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of 
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State 
were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly 
will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the 
people of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the 
Constitution.‖). 
 159. Cf. Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society:  
Social Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1593 (2001) 
(―The patterns of social life that support liberal democratic forms of civil 
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The state as educator, then, is no ideologically neutral 
actor.160  The philosophical foundations supporting a truly public 
education are the liberal biases of our nation‘s intellectual 
forbearers, biases in favor of a non-authoritarian approach to 
truth, of free argument and debate—what Thomas Jefferson 
called truth‘s ―natural weapons‖—and of a healthy sense of 
human fallibility.161 Unless children are to live under ―a 
perpetual childhood of prescription,‖ they must be exposed to the 
dust and heat of the race—intellectually, morally, spiritually. 162  
Whether one considers the formation of moral commitments a 
matter of choice or duty, of self-directedness or cultural 
embeddedness, the child must not be denied the type of education 
that will allow him, as an adult, to choose whether or not (and in 
what way, and to what degree) to honor those commitments.  A 
public education is the engine by which children find a place (or 
 
flourishing embody definite rankings of competing human goods, which will be 
associated with some versions of religious truth and not others.  In this sense, 
the project of promoting a healthy liberal democratic civil society is inevitably a 
deeply judgmental and non-neutral project.‖). 
 160. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Comment, Religious Children and the 
Inevitable Compulsion of Public Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 773, 778–79 
(1993) (―A value-free curriculum is clearly impossible . . . .  [S]chools simply 
cannot attain value-neutral or balanced education.  With only limited resources 
and time, they cannot possibly provide curricula that encompass the world‘s 
enormous mass of information and perspectives. Furthermore, subtle 
characteristics such as style and emphasis may undermine any substantive 
success in achieving balanced presentations.  Even if these practical difficulties 
could be overcome, an insurmountable conceptual problem remains:  Value 
neutrality itself has a value bias favoring the liberal philosophy embodied by 
the scientific method of inquiry.‖ (footnote omitted)); cf. Arons & Lawrence III, 
supra note 29, at 309 (―Schooling is . . . a manipulator of consciousness, an 
inculcator of values in young minds.‖). 
 161. Jefferson, supra note 30, at  xvii. 
 162. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, in JOHN MILTON:  COMPLETE POEMS AND 
MAJOR PROSE 727–28 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957) (1644) (―For those actions 
which enter into a man, rather than issue out of him, and therefore defile not, 
God uses not to captivate under a perpetual childhood of prescription, but trusts 
him with the gift of reason to be his own chooser; there were but little work left 
for preaching, if law and compulsion should grow so fast upon those things 
which heretofore were governed only by exhortation . . . . I cannot praise a 
fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies 
out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race where that immortal 
garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat.‖). 
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places) on ―the great sphere‖ that is their world and legacy.163  It 
is their means of escape from, or free commitment to, the social 
group in which they were born.  It is their best guarantee of an 
open future. 
In Meyer and Pierce the Court feared that the state as 
educator would ―standardize its children.‖164  But children sent to 
religiously or ethnically homogeneous private schools, or those 
kept cloistered at home, might more easily suffer a similar fate.  
We are well cautioned by family law historian Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse that ―[s]tamped on the reverse side of the coinage of 
family privacy and parental rights are the child‘s voicelessness, 
objectification, and isolation from the community.‖165  The open 
world of public schooling should challenge the transmission of 
any closed set of values, whether those values belong to parent or 
 
 163. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 159 
(1980) (―The entire educational system will, if you like, resemble a great sphere.  
Children land upon the sphere at different points, depending on their primary 
culture; the task is to help them explore the globe in a way that permits them to 
glimpse the deeper meanings of the life dramas passing on around them.  At the 
end of the journey, however, the now mature citizen has every right to locate 
himself at the very point from which he began—just as he may also strike out to 
discover an unoccupied portion of the sphere.‖). 
 164. Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (―The fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any 
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept 
instruction from public teachers only.‖).  On the threat of state indoctrination in 
the public schools, see, for example, Dent, Jr., supra note 136, at 707; Strossen, 
supra note 72; Arons & Lawrence III, supra note 29; Robert D. Kamenshine, 
The First Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1104 (1979); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory 
of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863 (1979); 
Joel S. Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child:  Legal Implications of 
Values Education, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 105 (1979); cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 117–18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859) (―A general State 
education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one 
another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the 
predominant power . . . whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, 
or the majority of the existing generation in proportion as it is efficient and 
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind.‖). 
 165. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?:  Meyer and Pierce 
and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1001 (1992); cf. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 163, at 160 (criticizing educational proposals that would 
―[legitimize] a series of petty tyrannies in which like-minded parents club 
together to force-feed their children without restraint‖). 
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state.  If education is to foster, in Eamonn Callan‘s words, ―[t]he 
cultivation of serious and independent ethical criticism, and the 
enlargement of the imagination that process entails,‖ 166 it must 
not only question parental authority but provide as well a brake 
on efforts at state indoctrination.167  Ideally, the state, like the 
ideal parent, would want to cultivate the child‘s capacity to make 
free choices.  But, like real parents, the state can behave less 
than liberally toward its young people.  The liberal state wants to 
pass on its traditions of freedom and equality, but the surest way 
not to do so would be to pass on those traditions as moral 
absolutes to be accepted uncritically.168  To guard against 
indoctrination at home or at school (or elsewhere, for that 
matter), the liberal state must provide a common education that 
prepares its children to make choices that are as free and 
independent as possible. 
The state as educator does not replace the parent as 
educator.  The parent remains a private source of intellectual 
and moral authority (as do a host of private players and entities).  
Indeed, against these private sources, ―the state is normally at a 
 
 166. CALLAN, supra note 90, at 5. 
 167. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for 
Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 188–89 (1995) (―[A] citizen needs to be able 
both to understand and internalize the norms of her society and to judge those 
norms against rational attack.  A predisposition to adopt certain values, coupled 
with the knowledge and critical skills necessary for citizenship, is likely to yield 
slow but careful changes that jeopardize nether the stability of the polity nor 
the liberty of its citizens.‖); Ingber, supra note 160, at 19 (―Society must 
indoctrinate children so they may be capable of autonomy. They must be 
socialized to the norms of society while remaining free to modify or even 
abandon those norms.‖). 
 168. Of course, the state as educator may have interests other than the 
child‘s intellectual welfare.  On the mixed motives undergirding historical 
efforts to regulate public schooling, see generally SAMUEL BOYLES & HERBERT 
GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA:  EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE 
CONTRADICTION OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1976); CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE 
REPUBLIC:  COMMON SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); MICHAEL B. 
KATZ, THE IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM: EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION IN MID-
NINETEENTH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS (1968); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD 
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE 
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:   SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(1971); DAVID TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM:  A HISTORY OF URBAN EDUCATION 
(1974); cf. DIANE RAVITCH, THE REVISIONISTS REVISITED:  A CRITIQUE OF THE 
RADICAL ATTACK ON THE SCHOOLS (1978). 
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disadvantage.‖169  Thus, even if the state were to mandate a 
common curriculum for all schools, public and private, the 
allocation of educational authority still would be shared by 
parent and state.  Ira Lupu usefully approaches the issue of 
educational pluralism by thinking in terms of separated powers, 
comparing the division of power and influence over the 
educational liberty of children to the Constitution‘s structural 
division of governmental power.170 This model of power 
 
 169. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940) (―What 
the school authorities are really asserting is the right to awaken in the child‘s 
mind considerations as to the significance of the flag contrary to those 
implanted by the parent.  In such an attempt the state is normally at a 
disadvantage in competing with the parent‘s authority, so long—and this is the 
vital aspect of religious toleration—as parents are unmolested in their right to 
counteract by their own persuasiveness the wisdom and rightness of those 
loyalties which the state‘s educational system is seeking to promote.‖), 
overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); cf. 
GUTMANN, supra note 90, at 69 (―[P]arents command a domain other than 
schools in which they can—and should—seek to educate their children, to 
develop their moral character and teach them religious or secular standards 
and skills that they value . . . . The discretionary domain for education—
particularly but not only for moral education—within the family has always 
been and must continue to be vast within a democratic society.  And the 
existence of this domain of parental discretion provides a partial defense 
against those who claim that public schooling is a form of democratic tyranny 
over the mind.‖). 
 170. See generally Lupu, supra note 74. See also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 
87, 105–06 (1st Cir. 2008) (―[T]he mere fact that a child is exposed on occasion 
in public school to a concept offensive to a parent‘s religious belief does not 
inhibit the parent from instructing the child differently.  A parent whose ‗child 
is exposed to sensitive topics or information [at school] remains free to discuss 
these matters and to place them in the family‘s moral or religious context, or to 
supplement the information with more appropriate materials.‘‖ (quoting C.N. v. 
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005)); GUTMANN, supra note 
90, at 42 (―A democratic state of education recognizes that educational authority 
must be shared among parents, citizens, and professional educators even 
though such sharing does not guarantee that power will be wedded to 
knowledge, that parents can successfully pass their prejudices on to their 
children, or that education will be neutral among competing conceptions of the 
good life.‖); Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s Education?:  
Parents, Children, and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2007) (―[G]iven 
the legitimacy of claims by the community to have a say in how its future 
citizens should be educated; the equally legitimate claims of parents to have a 
say in how their own children should be educated; the need for children to 
develop the autonomy that liberalism demands; and the needs of the polity to 
ensure that children come to possess the civic virtues necessary to perpetuate a 
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separation, as Lupu writes, ―reduces the risk of tyrannical 
treatment and domination of children‖ by parents as well as the 
state.171 
But parentalism is not about educational power sharing.  It 
is about control.  Parentalists who paint the public education 
system as ideologically monolithic and propose greater 
educational choice rarely purport to be the guardians of the 
child’s educational options.172 What the parentalist seeks to 
protect is the parent’s choice ―to reject schooling that promotes 
values contrary to their own.‖173  We can be certain that some 
parents will choose educational options precisely because they 
want monopolistic control over the ideas to which their children 
have access.  For some religious parents, no compromise is 
possible with the public school curriculum; no state regulation is 
 
healthy liberal democracy, none of these interests should be allowed to 
dominate education in public schools.  Instead, a vigorous liberal democracy 
must develop a framework for education that gives all of these interests some 
accommodation.‖); cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16 
(2004) (holding that a school requirement to recite Pledge of Allegiance does not 
impair parent‘s right to instruct his daughter in his religious views). 
 171. Lupu, supra note 74, at 189–90 (―We have learned as a people to be 
distrustful of despotic power.  The federal Constitution, and all of our state 
constitutions as well, proceed from the premise that dividing governmental 
power over adults will help safeguard their liberty.  Not surprisingly, we have 
developed analogous mechanisms to protect the liberty of children.  The division 
of power and influence over them among parents, school employees, and others 
in the community reduces the risk of tyrannical treatment and domination of 
children.‖). 
 172. On the public school as educational monolith,  see Strossen, supra note 
72, at 370 (―An additional characteristic of the typical public school, which 
further enhances the importance of protecting students‘ freedom of belief, is its 
relatively authoritarian, hierarchical, and disciplined structure.  This structure 
limits the students‘ opportunity to express or hear viewpoints at variance with 
those expressed by school officials.  In tandem with the compulsory education 
requirement and the students‘ relative impressionability, the school‘s structure 
makes students especially vulnerable to the influence of teachers and other 
school authorities, who wield significant power over them.‖); Arons & Lawrence 
III, supra note 29, at 317 (comparing public school to other ―total institutions‖); 
cf. Yudof, supra note 164, at 902 (describing school as a ―semitotal‖ institution). 
 173. Gilles, supra note 81, at 938. This reality can be masked by referring to 
parental choice as ―family choice.‖ See also, e.g., Arons & Lawrence III, supra 
note 29, at 325 (―The government allows families to inculcate their own values 
by choosing private schools.‖). 
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acceptable;174 and the only educational option is the ideological 
and social segregation of private schooling.175  Even proponents of 
 
 174. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Acad. v. Town of East Longmeadow, 
666 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D. Mass. 1987) (―Plaintiffs believe that parents are 
required by their religion to educate their children to share their faith.  They 
also believe that they are obligated by God to provide as an indispensable 
ministry of their church a school which teaches their religious beliefs. For 
plaintiffs, the secular and religious aspects of education are inseparable.  Thus, 
in its educational ministry, New Life teaches all subjects from a biblical and 
Christian view of the world.  Plaintiffs believe they are forbidden to send their 
children to schools, such as public schools, which they believe teach doctrines 
contrary to the Holy Scriptures.‖). 
 175. See MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 58 (1999) 
(arguing that ―it is difficult for children to achieve autonomy solely within the 
bounds of their families and home communities—or even within the bounds of 
schools whose norms are constituted by those held by the child‘s home 
community‖); cf. Rob Reich, Testing the Boundaries of Parental Authority over 
Education, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 299 (Stephen Macedo & Yael 
Tamir eds., 2002) (―I submit that even in a minimal construal of autonomy, it 
must be the function of the school setting to expose children to and engage 
children with values and beliefs other than those of their parents.  To achieve 
minimal autonomy requires that a child know that there are ways of life other 
than that into which he or she has been born.  Minimal autonomy requires, 
especially for its civic importance, that a child be able to examine his or her own 
political values and beliefs, and those of others, with a critical eye.  It requires 
that the child be able to think independently.  If this is all true, then at a bare 
minimum, the structure of schooling cannot simply replicate in every 
particularity the values and beliefs of a child‘s home.‖). The social segregation of 
private schooling can be its own form of intellectual incapacitation.  The child 
misses the associational incitements, good and bad, that accompany a diverse 
peer group. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 89, at 1233 (suggesting that public 
education might be required in order to facilitate adolescent associational 
activity with unlike peers); cf. In re Kurowski, 20 A.3d 306, 319 (N.H. 2011) 
(noting that in custody decision trial court was ―guided by the premise that 
education is by its nature an exploration and examination of new things, and by 
the premise that a child requires academic, social, cultural, and physical 
interaction with a variety of experiences, people, concepts, and surroundings in 
order to grow to an adult who can make intelligent decisions about how to 
achieve a productive and satisfying life‖). But cf. Eugene Volokh, Preference for 
Public School over Homeschooling—and Maybe Private Schooling—Partly 
Because It Provides “Exposure to Different Points of View”?, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 17, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/03/17/preference-for-public-
school-over-homeschooling-and-maybe-private-schooling-partly-because-it-
provides-exposure-to-different-points-of-view/#contact (―It may well be in [a] 
child‘s best interests to be exposed to more views in public school—or it may 
well be in the child‘s best interests to avoid the views that public school will 
expose her to. Those are not judgments that courts should generally make given 
the First Amendment.‖).  And the child will never meet that teacher who, just 
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public school choice may show little interest in schooling that is 
 
by being a non-parental role model, opens the eyes of children to new and 
unimagined vistas. Cf. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986) (―Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by 
their conduct and deportment in and out of class.  Inescapably, like parents, 
they are role models.‖); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1978) (―Within 
the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing students‘ 
attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citizens in our 
society.  Alone among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the other varied 
activities of a modern school.  In shaping the students‘ experience to achieve 
educational goals, teachers by necessity have wide discretion over the way the 
course material is communicated to students . . . . Further, a teacher serves as a 
role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their 
perceptions and values.  Thus, through both the presentation of course 
materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence 
the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a 
citizen‘s social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good 
health of a democracy.‖).  Before the boom era of the modern home-schooling 
movement, social segregation was a concern that courts took seriously, 
routinely upholding state educational regimes that did not permit home 
instruction. See, e.g., State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 378 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) 
(―By bringing children into contact with some person, other than those in the 
excluded group, those children are exposed to at least one other set of attitudes, 
values, morals, lifestyles and intellectual abilities.‖); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 
2d 359, 366 (W. Va. 1981).  The defendants in Riddle were ―Biblical Christians‖ 
who, according to the court, ―[were] determined to have their children totally 
indoctrinated and educated in their religious beliefs, with no smattering of 
heresy.‖ Riddle, 285 S.E.2d at 361. The parents ―never requested the county 
superintendent of schools to approve their home as a place for instruction,‖ as 
required by law. Id. at 363.  With less than abundant generosity of spirit, the 
court thought it was ―inconceivable that in the twentieth century the free 
exercise clause of the first amendment implies that children can lawfully be 
sequestered on a rural homestead during all of their formative years to be 
released upon the world only after their opportunities to acquire basic skills 
have been foreclosed and their capacity to cope with modern society has been so 
undermined as to prohibit useful, happy or productive lives.‖ Id. at 366; cf. 
State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170, 170–71 (N.H. 1929) (―Education in public schools is 
considered by many to furnish desirable and even essential training for 
citizenship, apart from that gained by the study of books.  The association with 
those of all classes of society, at an early age and upon a common level, is not 
unreasonably urged as a preparation for discharging the duties of a citizen.‖); 
Knox v. O‘Brien, 72 A.2d 389, 392 (Cape May County Ct. 1950) (―Cloister and 
shelter have its place, but not in the every day give and take of life . . . . The 
entire lack of free association with other children being denied to [the O‘Brien 
children], by design or otherwise, which is afforded them at public school, leads 
me to the conclusion that they are not receiving education equivalent to that 
provided in the public schools in the third and fifth grades.‖). 
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ideologically pluralistic.  The charter school movement may hold 
the promise of a common education without the curricular 
rigidity of a common schooling,176 and more attention should be 
paid to the role that charter schools, including religious charter 
schools, might play in a public school system;177 but charter 
schools ought to be more than a state-supported means of 
forming an ideologically bounded community ―within which like-
minded parents and teachers can reside.‖178 (And, it goes without 
 
 176. On ―separate schooling,‖ see, for example, CALLAN, supra note 90, at 
162–95; Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Education and the Democratic Ideal, 
in MAKING GOOD CITIZENS:   EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY 213–32 (Diane 
Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001).  On charter schools, see generally 
INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS:  THE PARADOX OF RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION (Bruce 
Fuller ed., 2000). See also Pearl Rock Kane & Chrisopher J. Lauricella, 
Assessing the Growth and Potential of Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING 
EDUCATION:  CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL 
COHESION? 203–33 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001); Amy Stuart Wells, Privatization 
and Charter School Reform:  Economic, Political, and Social Dimensions, in 
PRIVATIZING EDUCATION:   CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EQUITY, AND 
SOCIAL COHESION? 234–59 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001). 
 177. A common state-mandated curriculum could ensure that all charter 
schools, including religious ones, do not become segregated educational 
enclaves.  Charter schools that satisfy common curricular requirements would 
be able to add focused educational offerings compatible with religious values 
and culture. (In addition, they would be able to make reasonable 
accommodations logistically impossible for the public schools.)  Additions to a 
common curriculum are consistent with the core principle of Meyer and Pierce 
that a parent has a right, ―after he has complied with all proper requirements 
by the state as to education, to give his child such further education in proper 
subjects as he desires and can afford.‖ Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 104 (Neb. 
1922) (Letton, J., dissenting); cf. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 
(1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (―The capacity to impart instruction to others is 
given by the Almighty for beneficent purposes and its use may not be forbidden 
or interfered with by Government—certainly not, unless such instruction is, in 
its nature, harmful to the public morals or imperils the public safety.‖).  While 
state support of pervasively sectarian schools would violate the Establishment 
Clause, many church-affiliated charter schools could embrace a common state-
mandated curriculum and a diverse student/faculty body without considering 
their normative religious mission in danger of being undermined.  On religious 
charter schools, see, for example, Preston Green III, Charter Schools and 
Religious Institutions:  A Match Made in Heaven?, 158 WESTLAW EDUC. L. REP. 
1 (2001); Benjamin Siracusa Hilton, Note, Is There a Place for Religious Charter 
Schools?, 118 YALE L.J. 554 (2008). 
 178. Bruce Fuller, The Public Square, Big or Small?:  Charters Schools in 
Political Context, in INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE PARADOX OF RADICAL 
DECENTRALIZATION 14 (Bruce Fuller ed., 2000). 
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saying, students who will be expected to be equally like-minded.) 
One advocate of educational choice observes approvingly that a 
charter school would provide parents ―with the opportunity to 
create a free public school that, while it does not teach their 
religious beliefs, also does not teach lessons that they find 
religiously objectionable.‖179  Indeed, it has been argued that ―if 
students are financially empowered to choose among a variety of 
secular and religious schools, the compulsion to protect their 
individual consciences from the moral or religious content 
embodied in the curriculum or environment at any particular 
school dissipates significantly.‖180  Of course, it hardly needs to 
be pointed out that children do not make these choices.  If 
parental choice can mean that the compulsion to protect a child‘s 
conscience dissipates, then the safest place for a child‘s 
conscience is the traditional public school. 
In the broadest sense, an education that is ideologically or 
socially reclusive robs children of community.  It keeps from 
them a common intellectual and cultural capital.  Even the 
children of a separatist religious community are members of 
many other communities: political, historical, philosophical, 
artistic.  They belong to a past as well as a present; they live, 
geographically and otherwise, in multiple jurisdictions.  A liberal 
education takes heed of this.  It respects the rootedness of 
children‘s lives, teaching children from the inside, in what 
Warren Nord has nicely called ―the communities of memory 
which tentatively define them.‖181 A liberal education is 
 
 179. LAWRENCE D. WEINBERG, RELIGIOUS CHARTER SCHOOLS:  LEGALITIES AND 
PRACTICALITIES 2 (2007). 
 180. Robert K. Vischer, The Sanctity of Conscience in an Age of School 
Choice:  Grounds for Skepticism, 6 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 
81, 96 (2006). 
 181. WARREN NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION:   RETHINKING A 
NATIONAL DILEMMA 202–03 (1995) (―Liberal education has both a conservative 
and a liberating task:  it should provide students a ballast of historical 
identities and values at the same time that it gives them an understanding of 
alternatives and provides critical distance on the particularities of their 
respective inheritances . . . .  The essential tension of a liberal education, 
properly understood, lies in its commitment to initiating students into the 
communities of memory which tentatively define them, and, at the same time, 
nurturing critical reflection by initiating them into an ongoing conversation 
that enables them to understand and appreciate alternative ways of living and 
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inherently conservative, reinforcing cultural continuity.  In this 
sense, a liberal education is inherently liberating, freeing 
children from cultural discontinuity.  A liberal education also 
respects the self-directedness of children‘s‘ lives, teaching 
children from the outside, from a stance (again, Nord) of ―critical 
distance on the particularities of their respective inheritances.‖182  
These are not incompatible lessons.  We reinforce tradition as we 
come to understand it and even as we come to reinterpret it. 
Children who are cut off from an understanding of—or, at 
least, an introduction to—foreign ideas and values, cultures and 
traditions, suffer more than an intellectual loss.  Understanding 
what is ―other‖ is an exercise of heart and soul as well as mind; 
in Eamonn Callan‘s phrase, it requires ―the enlargement of the 
imagination,‖183 the experience ―of entering imaginatively into 
ways of life that are strange, even repugnant, and some 
developed ability to respond to them with interpretive charity.‖184  
This is why, according to Nord, a liberal education must nurture 
―passions and imagination as well as thinking,‖185 why it must 
nurture the faculties that allow children to get inside alternative 
ways of life and ―to feel the[ir] intellectual and emotional 
power.‖186  This human and humane sympathy is not an elective 
subject, an option to be selected after the child has learned basic 
reasoning skills.  As both Nord and Callan (and others) remind 
us, developing the faculties that allow for sympathetic 
engagement with ―otherness‖ is a process at the core of teaching 
children to understand themselves. 
[I]t is only when we can feel the intellectual and emotional 
power of alternative cultures and traditions that we are 
justified in rejecting them.  If they remain lifeless and 
uninviting this is most likely because we do not understand 
them, because we have not gotten inside them so that we can 
feel their power as their adherents do.  Only if we can do this 
 
thinking.‖). 
 182. Id. at 202. 
 183. CALLAN, supra note 90, at 5. 
 184. Id. at 133. 
 185. NORD, supra note 181, at 202. 
 186. Id. at 201. 
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are we in a position to make judgments, to conclude, however 
tentatively, that some ways of thinking and living are better or 
worse than others.187 
Kept out of a conversation to which their birthright entitles 
them to join, cloistered children are cut off from themselves, 
bereft of self-consciousness and awareness of cultural place, and 
denied the moral freedom to stand or fall.  Only through wide 
and fair exposure to moral and intellectual difference can 
children ―surpass the threshold of ethical servility.‖188 
The Supreme Court has identified autonomy and tolerance as 
the fundamental values indispensable ―in the preparation of 
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation 
of the values on which our society rests . . . .‖189  The prerequisite 
for both autonomy and tolerance is exposure. To think for 
themselves, children must know how others think; to take their 
place as members of a liberal democracy, they must learn to 
make room for the places that other members will take.  Our 
constitutional freedoms are predicated on the republican distrust 
of authoritarian ideologies and a profound skepticism toward 
final and complete truths.190  The Supreme Court has said, a bit 
hyperbolically perhaps, that ―[t]eachers and students must 
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain 
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die.‖191 Constitutionally speaking, we are all 
students and teachers. 
Liberal pluralists concede that some religious groups will 
create lives that run far counter to cultural norms, separate lives 
where they can educate their children without exposing them to 
and engaging them with diverse values and beliefs.  For Galston, 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Reich, supra note 175, at 293.  For a multiculturalist defense of 
exposure to otherness, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 82–83 
(1995); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 204 (1986); CHARLES TAYLOR, 2 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 204–05 (1985). 
 189. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). 
 190. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; see also supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. 
 191. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). 
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a liberal society can and should make room for religious 
separatism: ―Autonomy is one possible mode of existence in 
liberal societies—one among many others; its practice must be 
respected and safeguarded; but the devotees of autonomy must 
recognize the need for respectful coexistence with individuals and 
groups that do not give autonomy pride of place.‖192  Even a 
proponent of autonomy-facilitation like Harry Brighouse agrees 
that civic stability does not require everyone to lead autonomous 
lives, as long as enough people do so ―to yield a threshold level of 
stability.‖193  But one need not quarrel with the virtue of peaceful 
coexistence to ask about the fate of children whose families and 
communities do not give autonomy pride of place.  While 
democracy may survive if it maintains a threshold level of 
stability, this is no reason to assign some children to a life 
without free choice.194 
Yet if the classroom really is, as the Supreme Court has said, 
―peculiarly the marketplace of ideas,‖195 the voices of religious 
children must be allowed to be heard, too.  The school classroom, 
at every level, should be a forum where students are exposed to a 
variety of viewpoints, secular and religious. The idea that 
students benefit from exposure to opposing viewpoints only 
makes sense if that benefit flows in all directions.  To that end, 
the study of religion should be a regular part of a common 
curriculum.  The state has a compelling interest in teaching 
children the ―fundamental values of habits and manners of 
 
 192. GALSTON, supra note 69, at  24. See also generally MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
 193. Brighouse, supra note 154, at 269; cf. WALZER, supra note 192, at 219 
(1983) (stating that there is no need for a ―frontal assault‖ on private schools as 
long as the chief effect is ―to provide ideological diversity on the margins of a 
predominately public system‖). 
 194. Cf. ARCHARD, supra note 137, at 75–76 (―A pluralistic culture is 
important not for its own sake but because it is the natural outcome of the 
exercise of autonomous life-choices and, at the same time, the invaluable, 
indeed indispensable, background against which autonomy is exercised.  This 
point is significant for it means that children must still be reared to be 
autonomous.  If all that mattered was pluralism as such it would suffice that 
families produced heteronomous adults with very different outlooks on life. 
What the argument from pluralism shows, however, is that families are to be 
valued for producing diverse, but also autonomous, adults.‖). 
 195. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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civility essential to a democratic society,‖196 but if children are to 
learn a civility that is more than mere manners, then the state 
must let them speak for themselves (whether they speak the 
language of reason or faith) and for their community and culture 
(whether that background is informed by religious or secular 
values).  The voices of religious children must be allowed to be 
heard—for the educational benefit of the entire class.  The 
classroom that welcomes appropriate religious expression may 
also be a less threatening place for some religious parents.197 
Many religious parents are concerned, and rightly so, that 
school officials sponsor particular religious or political beliefs—
not deliberately, perhaps, but by a failure to see their own beliefs 
as partial viewpoints.  Certainly, the principle of exposure can be 
manipulated for use as a political instrument, a latter-day 
version of the child-saving strategies of the nineteenth century.198  
But exposure, if it is genuinely implemented, operates on more 
intellectually generous principles.  First, if autonomy is to be 
taken seriously, then liberals as well as conservatives, the 
secular-minded as well as the faithful, must be willing to look 
critically at their own values and beliefs. The voices of all 
children need to be heard, with fairness and respect.  Compulsory 
education requirements presuppose ―sympathetic and critical 
engagement with beliefs and ways of life at odds with the culture 
of the family or religious or ethnic group into which the child is 
born[;]‖199 they entail the effort to foster respect for difference 
 
 196. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 197. See, e.g., GUTMANN, supra note 90, at 122–23 (stating that refusal to 
permit exemptions from some required practices will drive parents away from 
public schools); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious 
Fundamentalism:  The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHICS 468, 488 (1995) 
(observing that school officials may have prudential reasons to accommodate 
religious parents in order to keep their children in public schools). 
 198. See generally Bruce Bellingham, Institution and Family: An Alternative 
View of Nineteenth-Century Child Saving, 33 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 533 (1986). 
 199. CALLAN, supra note 90, at 133. But see Tyll van Geel, Citizenship 
Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L. REV. 293 (2000) 
(arguing that programs to promote specific conceptions of tolerance are 
themselves intolerant); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut 
Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993) (discussing the liberal society‘s paradoxical 
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and a willingness to entertain, if only for the sake of argument, 
ideas that go against the familial grain.  Second, exposure is not 
a ready means to discount the history and culture that children 
bring with them to school. Respect for difference does not 
presuppose the child‘s rejection of his primary culture.  Just the 
opposite should be the case: The classroom should be a place 
where the child‘s primary commitments can be strengthened; it 
should be a place where children can go to be understood as well 
as to understand others. 200  What compulsory education 
requirements seek to ensure is that, at a minimum, the child 
learns that there are important choices to be made, and that no 
source of authority—parent or teacher—has the right to deny 
someone the opportunity to make choices that are genuinely free. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS ADVOCACY 
When Susan Murphy was thirteen years old, she began to 
explore the beliefs of the Hare Krishna religion.201 She was 
taught, among other things, that women are inferior to men, that 
the female form is the form of evil, that women should always 
consult a man before making any type of decision, and that a 
woman should take her husband as her spiritual authority.202  
Upon leaving the church, Susan sued the church, alleging that 
church teachings had caused her emotional distress.203  Expert 
psychiatric testimony supported Susan‘s claim, and she received 
a jury award of $210,000.204 
On appeal, the Massachusetts State Supreme Court vacated 
 
intolerance of the intolerant). 
 200. Cf., e.g., Steven C. Rockefeller, Comment, in MULTICULTURALISM:  
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 97–98 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) 
(―[A]ny liberal democratic politics committed to the ideals of freedom and 
equality cannot escape the demand that it create inclusive and sustaining social 
environments that respect all peoples in their cultural diversity, giving them a 
feeling of belonging to the larger community.‖). 
 201. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Mass. 
1991). 
 202. Id. at 346. 
 203. Id. at 344. 
 204. Id. at 346. 
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the emotional distress judgment.205  Concluding that tort liability 
amounted to punishment for religious heterodoxy, the court 
barred what it considered to be a constitutionally impermissible 
evaluation of the church‘s religious beliefs: ―The essence of what 
occurred in the trial is that the plaintiffs were allowed to suggest 
to the jury extensively that exposure to the defendant‘s religious 
beliefs was sufficient to cause tortious emotional damage . . . .‖206  
No defendant, the court maintained, should be forced to prove 
―that the substance of its religious beliefs is worthy of respect.‖207 
For the Murphy court, the key question was whether Susan‘s 
testimony related to conduct or belief.  The court rejected her 
argument that religious teaching is activity, not belief: ―Inherent 
in the claim that exposure to [defendant‘s] religious beliefs 
causes tortious emotional damage is the notion that the disputed 
beliefs are fundamentally flawed . . . .‖208  The court suggested 
that Susan‘s age ―may lessen the degree of constitutional 
protection which [the church] has against a claim of an 
intentional tort based on religiously motivated activity.‖209  But it 
would not be enough.  According to the court, the nature of 
Susan‘s case would ―embroil[] the court in an assessment of the 
propriety of those beliefs regardless of the age of the plaintiffs.‖210  
Essentially, the court would not conduct a heresy trial. 
In fact, whether the church‘s religious beliefs were 
―fundamentally flawed‖ was really irrelevant.  The right legal 
question was not whether the female form is truly evil (as the 
church taught), but whether Susan Murphy could show that the 
church‘s teachings, regardless of their truth or falsity, had 
caused her tortious injury.  To borrow from the law of evidence, 
the court did not need to decide the truth of the matter 
asserted.211  In the adjudication of such cases, courts can, and 
must, restrict their inquiries to objective measures of emotional 
 
 205. Id. at 342. 
 206. Id. at 347. 
 207. Id. at 348. 
 208. Id. at 347. 
 209. Id. at 349. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
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and psychological harm to children.212 
Adults consent to religious association, but the religious 
identity of children is determined without their consent or 
understanding.213  They are made members of religious groups by 
birthright, or ceremonies of induction and initiation, or other 
rules of religious affiliation.  Not possessing  the full capacity for 
individual choice,214 children are by their very nature captive to 
the will of others.215  This vulnerability drives the concern that 
 
 212. Cf. Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Mass. 1997) (finding 
that a restriction on the father‘s right to share religious belief with his children 
―does not foster excessive government entanglement because the focus of any 
judicial inquiry will center on the emotional or physical harm to the children 
rather than the merit worthiness of the parties‘ respective religious teachings‖). 
 213. By freely choosing to unite themselves with the spiritually like-minded, 
adults submit to be governed by the rules of religious membership.  But 
religious authority may not be imposed on those unwilling to subject themselves 
to it.  See, e.g., Guinn v. Church of, 775 P.2d 766, 781 (Okla. 1989) (―[T]he First 
Amendment will not shield a church from civil liability for imposing its will, as 
manifested through a disciplinary scheme, upon an individual who has not 
consented to undergo ecclesiastical discipline.‖). Thus, once a member 
withdraws consent, see, for example, id., or where a religious entity has used 
coercive techniques to undermine a member‘s capacity to consent, the 
constitutional shield that safeguards religious freedom against tort liability is 
appropriately broken, see, for example, Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass‘n for the 
Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d 46, 56–63 (Cal. 1988) (reversing 
summary judgment for church on emotional distress claim where atmosphere of 
coercive persuasion rendered plaintiffs incapable of deciding not to join church); 
Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 1, 7–19 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989) (affirming emotional distress judgment for plaintiff where church 
conducted religious practices in coercive environment); cf., e.g., Guinn, 775 P.2d 
at 776 (―No real freedom to choose religion would exist in this land if under the 
shield of the First Amendment religious institutions could impose their will on 
the unwilling and claim immunity from secular judicature for their tortious 
acts.‖). 
 214. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (―Viewed together, 
our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same 
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the 
State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children‘s vulnerability 
. . . .‖). 
 215. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the result). 
  Where a listening audience is effectively captive to the will of the 
speaker, ―government regulation of [protected] expression may co-exist with and 
even implement First Amendment guarantees.‖ Id.  On the captive audience 
doctrine, see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000) (upholding statute 
that prohibited speakers from approaching unwilling listeners outside health 
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care facilities); Madsen v. Women‘s Health Ctr., Inc.,  512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) 
(targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens psychological well-being of 
the patient held ―captive‖ by medical circumstance); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474, 484 (1988) (residential privacy protects the ―unwilling listener‖ from 
unwanted and intrusive speech); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the psychological tensions and pressures 
that result from targeted residential picketing); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (―Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the 
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the 
home, where the individual‘s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.‖ (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep‘t, 397 
U.S. 728 (1970))); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1975) 
(noting that restrictions on speech are warranted when the degree of captivity 
―makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure‖); 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (noting that riders 
on city transit system are captive audience); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738 (―We 
therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the 
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. 
If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is 
that no one has a right to press even ‗good‘ ideas on an unwilling recipient. That 
we are often ‗captives‘ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives 
everywhere.‖ (citing Public Utilities Comm‘n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952))); 
Pollak, 343 U.S. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (riders on street railway and 
bus system are captive audience); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1949) 
(―The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet 
in the street but cannot be made to take it.‖) (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 
147, 162 (1939))); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) (viewers of 
display advertising on billboards and street car placards have messages thrust 
upon them ―without the exercise of choice or volition on their part‖); cf. 
Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 1980) (religious ―witnessing‖ 
to prisoners who cannot ―escape‖ the preaching violates Free Exercise Clause). 
But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971) (persons confronted with 
defendant‘s jacket bearing the words ―Fuck the Draft‖ could have avoided 
―further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes‖); 
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978) (residents could ―simply 
avoid‖ Nazi-affiliated protest activities). 
  Some courts have addressed captivity of a psychological sort, the kind 
of incapacity to make decisions that may afflict those who endure coercive 
indoctrination techniques.  On coercive indoctrination techniques, see generally 
CULTS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW:  PERSPECTIVES ON NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 
(Thomas Robbins et al. eds., 1985); MARK GALANTER, CULTS: FAITH, HEALING, 
AND COERCION (1989); JOHN LOFLAND, DOOMSDAY CULT:  A STUDY OF 
CONVERSION, PROSELYTIZATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF FAITH (1966); THOMAS 
ROBBINS, CULTS, CONVERTS, AND CHARISMA: THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE NEW 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS (1988); A. JAMES RUDIN & MARCIA R. RUDIN, PRISON OR 
PARADISE?:  THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS (1980); Richard Delgado, Cults and 
Conversion:  The Case for Informed Consent, 16 GA. L. REV. 533 (1982); Richard 
Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First 
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public schoolchildren are easy targets for state indoctrination.216  
But children are no less captive to private educators—indeed, 
where cut off from ideas and values contrary to those of the 
home, they are likely to be more so; and religious mentorship 
carries with it a form of authority from which children may find 
it especially difficult to escape. 
When courts consider the tort liability of religious mentors, 
they commonly ask two questions: (1) whether liability would 
infringe upon belief as opposed to conduct, and (2) whether the 
conduct was secular or, if the conduct is deemed religious, 
whether it is a central part of the religious teachings of the 
defendant (and, thus, prohibition would be a substantial burden 
on religious freedom).217  But both questions rest on dubious 
 
Amendment, 51 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1977); Robert N. Shapiro, Of Robots, 
Persons, and the Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (1983).  
Though brainwashing is a controversial theory, some courts have recognized 
that coercive persuasion in religious settings may vitiate consent. See, e.g., 
Molko, 762 P.2d at 61 (religious organization can be held liable on a traditional 
cause of action in fraud for deceiving nonmembers into subjecting themselves, 
without their knowledge or consent, to coercive persuasion); Wollersheim, 66 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15 (religious practices conducted in a coercive environment do 
not qualify as voluntary religious practices entitled to constitutional protection); 
Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980) (―Coercive persuasion is 
fostered through the creation of a controlled environment that heightens the 
susceptibility of a subject to suggestion and manipulation through sensory 
deprivation, physiological depletion, cognitive dissonance, peer pressure, and a 
clear assertion of authority and dominion.  The aftermath of indoctrination is a 
severe impairment of autonomy and the ability to think independently, which 
induces a subject‘s unyielding compliance and the rupture of past connections, 
affiliations and associations.‖). But see Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass‘n, 589 F. Supp. 
10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983) (no cognizable action against religious organization on 
basis of alleged tort of brainwashing and indoctrination); Meroni v. Holy Spirit 
Ass‘n, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (rejecting claim of 
brainwashing where methods of indoctrination are commonly used by religious 
groups). 
 216. On the threat of state indoctrination in the public schools, see, for 
example, Arons & Lawrence III, supra note 29; Dent, Jr., supra note 136, at 707 
(1993); Kamenshine, supra note 164; Strossen, supra note 72; Yudof, supra note 
164; Moskowitz, supra note 164; cf. MILL, supra note 164, at 117–18 (―A general 
State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one 
another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the 
predominant power . . . whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, 
or the majority of the existing generation in proportion as it is efficient and 
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind . . . .‖). 
 217. See, e.g., Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371–72 
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grounds. 
The line between belief and conduct is not as bright as we 
might think.218  Laura Schubert discovered how quickly bright 
lines can lead to confusion when she sued the Pleasant Glade 
Assembly of God.219  In Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. 
Schubert, Schubert brought a tort claim based on the emotional 
injuries she suffered when church members, against Laura‘s 
objections, sought to cast demons out of her.220  Laura was 
physically restrained as part of a ―laying on of hands,‖ and 
subsequently she commenced a tort action for assault, battery, 
and false imprisonment.221 The Supreme Court of Texas 
concluded that the adjudication of such claims ―would necessarily 
require an inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.‖222  
In the court‘s judgment, ―the act of ‗laying hands‘ [was] infused in 
Pleasant Glade‘s religious belief system.‖223  The court ignored 
the irony that this judgment was itself a determination about 
doctrinal matters.  Dissenting from the majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Jefferson was on more solid ground when he observed 
that ―[i]n reaching the conclusion that the act of ‗laying hands‘ is 
infused in Pleasant Glade‘s religious belief system, the Court 
engages in the unconstitutional conduct it purports to avoid: 
deciding issues of religious doctrine.‖224 
When courts assess what is a substantial burden on religion, 
they do so despite the Supreme Court‘s admonition that it is not 
 
(D.R.I. 1978). 
 218. See, e.g., Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc.,  571 N.E.2d 340, 345 
(Mass. 1991) (rejecting argument that religious teaching was conduct, not 
belief).  On the belief/conduct distinction, see generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 219. 264 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2008). 
 220. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 5 (Tex. 2008). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 9 (quoting Tilton v. Marshall, 9025 S.W.2d 672, 682 (Tex. 1996)); 
see also Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc‘y of N.Y., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (―Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for 
maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its practices—or against 
its members.‖). 
 223. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 11. 
 224. Id. at 18 n.7 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting (citation omitted)). 
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the business of the courts to determine what beliefs or practices 
are central to a religious tradition.225  But what if litigation itself 
is a substantial burden?  In Schubert‘s case, the church did not 
seek protection from Laura‘s secular claims of false 
imprisonment and assault.  To these claims, the church stated, 
its religious belief and practices were ―actually irrelevant.‖226  In 
its words: 
Plaintiff, Laura Schubert, a teenager, does bring a secular 
complaint against the church and its pastors.  It begins when, 
according to her own pleading, she ―collapsed‖ while standing 
at the altar of the church during a church service.  She alleges 
she was physically grasped, taken and held on the floor of the 
Church against her will. This was allegedly done as part of an 
“exorcism” in an alleged attempt to exorcise a demon from her. 
However, this religious context is actually irrelevant. Since 
Laura Schubert alleges she was held on the floor against her 
will, she brings claims for assault, battery, and false 
imprisonment. This is a “bodily injury” claim . . . Relators,   the 
church and the pastors, concede that this is a “secular 
controversy” and does not come within the protection of the First 
Amendment. That is, no church or pastor can use the First 
Amendment as an excuse to cause bodily injury to any person . . 
. .  
If this were the sum total of this dispute, Relators [i.e., the 
church defendants] would not be here before this Court . . . No 
religious beliefs would be implicated.  The First Amendment 
and the free exercise of religion would simply not be an issue. 
Therefore, Relators do not request that this Court issue 
mandamus to stop litigation of this “secular controversy for 
 
 225. See Emp‘t Div., Dep‘t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 
(1990) (―Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts 
must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or 
the plausibility of a religious claim.‖); Hernandez v. Comm‘r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989) (―It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular 
beliefs or practices to a faith . . . .‖); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (―Judging 
the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable 
‗business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.‘‖ 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring))). 
 226. Schubert, 264 S.W. 3d at 7. 
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bodily injury.‖227 
Nonetheless, the court held that the church was 
constitutionally protected ―against claims of intangible harm 
derived from its religious practice of ‗laying hands.‘‖228  The 
Schubert court decided that a restriction on the ―laying hands‖ 
practice would be a substantial burden.229  Even if the tort claim 
could be decided without regard to religion, the adjudication of 
the claim—that is to say, the mere fact that the church was 
subject to tort liability—―would have an unconstitutional ‗chilling 
effect‘ by compelling the church to abandon core principles of its 
religious beliefs.‖230 
Though Yoder‘s harm standard fails to offer children the full 
measure of protection they need, it does set an outer limit to the 
right of religious indoctrination.  Where indoctrination ―impairs a 
child‘s emotional development or sense of self-worth,‖231 the state 
should protect the child by allowing religious mentors to be 
subject to tort liability.  This protection need not come at the cost 
of constitutional privilege for religious entities.  Tort liability is 
not premised on the judgment that a religious belief is somehow 
―fundamentally flawed‖ or not worthy of constitutional 
protection.232 To the contrary, whether religious advocacy was 
meant to and did inflict severe emotional distress is a question 
that can be adjudicated by the neutral and generally applicable 
principles of tort law.233 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 8. 
 229. Id. at 11. 
 230. Id. at 10. 
 231. The definition of ―child abuse and neglect‖ under the federal Child 
Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act of 1996 (CAPTA) includes serious 
emotional harm. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g (2006). The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services defines emotional abuse as ―a pattern of behavior that impairs 
a child‘s emotional development or sense of self-worth. This may include 
constant criticism, threats, or rejection, as well as withholding love, support, or 
guidance.‖ U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Serv., CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION 
GATEWAY 3 (2008), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/ 
whatiscan.pdf. 
 232. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (―[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve 
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‗valid and neutral law of 
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It is a powerful and remarkable privilege to control the 
spiritual consciousness of another.  And it is not immune from 
abuse. Children need to be protected from religious 
indoctrination that is psychologically injurious, but, more broadly 
speaking, they need to be safeguarded from mentorship that 
denies them the ability to make independent choices about 
religious matters.234  Religious mentorship should make, so to 
 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).‘‖ (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 
263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment))); Presbyterian Church 
in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem‘l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969) (―Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by 
opening their doors to disputes involving church property.  And there are 
neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can 
be applied without ‗establishing‘ churches to which property is awarded.‖); 
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (―[W]e think the ‗neutral principles of 
law‘ approach is consistent with the foregoing constitutional principles.‖); see 
also, e.g., Smith v. O‘Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (finding that 
―there is no question that the principles of tort law, at issue, are both neutral 
and generally applicable‖); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431–32 (N.D. Iowa 
1997) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar tort claim against church 
defendants because claim can be assessed applying neutral principles of law); 
Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (finding 
no constitutional bar to adjudication of tort claim because ―‗neutral‘ principles of 
law can be applied without determining underlying questions of church law and 
policies‖ (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976))); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320–21 (Colo. 1993) (civil 
suit not barred by First Amendment because deciding claims does ―not require 
interpreting or weighing church doctrine and neutral principles of law can be 
applied‖); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1225 
(Me. 2005) (―[C]ourts do not inhibit the free exercise of religion by applying 
neutral principles of law to a civil dispute involving members of the clergy.‖); cf. 
Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 n.16 (Mass. 1997) (noting that ―[t]he 
GAL‘s report was based on interviews with the parents, the children, and the 
children‘s teachers, psychological tests, and observations of the children 
interacting with both parents‖); Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious 
Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and 
Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 502–03 (2005) (―[P]ositive religious questions, 
such as those concerning the content of religious beliefs or the importance of a 
religious practice within the context of a religion, do not call on courts to employ 
anything other than ordinary tools of judicial fact-finding and can be resolved 
through resort to traditional evidence, such as reliance on expert witnesses, 
treatises, and factual testimony.‖); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free 
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 45–46 (1990) (adjudication of emotional distress 
cases applies neutral rules). 
 234. Cf. Macleod, supra note 137, at 130 (―A refined liberal conception [of 
parental authority] does impose constraints on the strategies that parents may 
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speak, no permanent marks on the child; in other words, it must 
not foreclose the child‘s prospective religious freedom.  To direct, 
rather than to control, the religious destiny of the child: This is 
the great and challenging task, the heart (and soul) of the 
religious mentor‘s fiduciary responsibilities.235 
 
legitimately employ to transmit a conception of the good to children . . . . The 
general idea is that parents should be permitted to advance a distinctive 
conception of the good for their children.  However, parents must not seek to 
exempt the ends they wish their children to adopt from rational scrutiny.  Nor 
may parents undertake to foreclose the possibility of deliberation about such 
matters by tightly insulating children from exposure and access to the social 
conditions of deliberation.‖); David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, 
and the Constitution:  A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1, 25 
(1980) (―Parents may not justly mold their children‘s interests to conform with 
their own interests and values, no matter how profound, if they do so in a way 
that unfairly deprives the children of developing the capacity to assess these 
matters by rationally weighing arguments and evidence.‖). 
 235. The Supreme Court has defined the due process right to parent as ―the 
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.‖ Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  On the phrase ―care, custody, and control,‖ 
see Leebaert v. Harrrington, 332 F.3d 134, 142 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003): 
The Troxel Court appears to be the first to use the phrase ―care, 
custody, and control,‖ rather than the very similar ―care, custody, and 
management,‖ Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), in the 
context of a parent‘s right concerning his or her children.  Prior to 
Troxel, the phrase was typically used with respect to physical 
property, for example, in criminal statutes, see, e.g., Fischer v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 667, 675 (2000) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666 which 
prohibits theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal 
funds), and in the context of insurance policies, see, e.g., First 
Investors Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 162, 167 n.6 (2d Cir. 
1998) (quoting a portion of an insurance policy which read, ―The loss, 
depreciation in value, or damage to any real or personal property, 
including, but not limited to, money, securities, negotiable 
instruments or contracts representing money, held by or in the care, 
custody or control of the insured.‖).  After Troxel, federal courts of 
appeals have begun to employ the phrase to refer to parental rights. 
See, e.g., Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2003) (seizure of 
child violated mother‘s due process interest ―in the companionship, 
care, custody, and control of her child‖); Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, 
Youth and Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (―The 
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is 
among the most venerable of the liberty interests embedded in the 
Constitution.‖) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65); Littlefield v. Forney 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 288 (5th Cir. 2001) (―One of ‗the 
fundamental liberty interests‘ recognized by the Court is the ‗interest 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.‘‖) 
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With all its attendant joys, parenting is a somber task for it 
entails, in a profound and poignant way, the loss of the child.  It 
is the parent who enables the child to make free and independent 
choices, thus preparing the child to leave behind home and 
family, thus encouraging (or at least allowing) the child to form 
his or her own image rather than merely to conform to some 
parental likeness.  If we could, we might shield our children from 
the responsibilities and sufferings that accompany choice.  If we 
could, we might shield ourselves from the pain that accompanies 
the child‘s individuation and eventual separation from our hands.  
The law presumes that parents act in the best interests of their 
children, but, as every parent knows, it is often more difficult for 
parents to separate themselves from their children, to let go of 
them, than it is for children to follow the natural path to 
adulthood. 
Most of us do manage to let go.  We see every day that our 
children are on a path that leads to separation and individuation.  
We encourage that growth, validating the child‘s steps (literal 
and metaphorical) toward independence.  But we should not 
presume that all parents do so.  Deeply dependent on the child, 
desperately wanting the child to mirror, and thus affirm parental 
interests and emotions, the narcissistic parent uses any number 
of emotional tools—often disguised to parent and child alike as 
acts of love—to frustrate the child‘s assertions of selfhood. 
Among other students of parenting pathologies, the 
psychoanalyst Alice Miller has described how the narcissistic 
parent, ridden with a profound lack of security, disrupts the 
process by which children become morally, intellectually, and 
spiritually autonomous. 236  In fact, the narcissistic parent turns 
 
(quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66). 
 236. On parental narcissism, see generally ALICE MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT 
BE AWARE:  SOCIETY‘S BETRAYAL OF THE CHILD (1998); LEONARD SHENGOLD, SOUL 
MURDER:  THE EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE AND DEPRIVATION (1989); R.D. 
LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: AN EXISTENTIAL STUDY IN SANITY AND MADNESS 
(Penguin Books 1965) (1959); cf. Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the 
Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1326 (1994) (―[S]elf-love may be 
an unusually corrupting force when it comes into play in a parent-child 
relationship. When a politician or corporate official advances the interests of 
himself, his class, or his cronies, one would expect that he would at least be 
aware of the tension between his own interests and those of the commonwealth; 
SHULMAN (FINAL) 2/22/2012  11:15 AM 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 6 
162 
this developmental process on its head:  
 
 Healthy parenting serves the needs of the child.  One of the 
most important needs of the child is for mirroring (or echoing).  
By being a mirror of the child‘s emotions and interests, the 
parent reflects the child‘s evolving self-image. The act of 
mirroring enables the child to gain the trust and confidence that 
is a prerequisite to both individuation and intimacy.  In the 
natural course of events, children separate themselves from their 
parents. In the natural course of events, children form new 
relationships outside the family sphere of interest. 
 The narcissistic parent reverses this process. Narcissistic 
parents use the child as a mirror of their own interests and 
emotions.  The adult creates the child in his or her own image.  
The problem of individuation does not belong to the child: The 
problem is that it is difficult for parents to separate themselves 
from their children. 
 Emotional or psychological misconduct occurs when the 
love of the parent is made conditional on the child‘s mirroring of 
the adult image. The issue is obedience in the broadest sense.  It 
is not just a matter of following the rules, though that is 
important. It is more a matter of being like the adult, of thinking 
and acting like the adult. It is a matter of accepting the adult‘s 
set of interests and perspectives. It is even a matter of liking and 
loving the adult. 
 The child has no choice but to accept the images of approval 
and disapproval it receives from the parent, and to embrace these 
images as an ego ideal.  Conforming to an image needed and 
desired by the parent, the child represses its own need and 
desires.  The child represses its own will.  The price of not doing 
so is shame and humiliation (the child is willful, the child is bad).  
The child must accept that the adult is not at fault.  If my parent 
 
cognitive dissonance has its limits.  In the parent-child relationship, however, 
the capacity for self-deception may be at its maximum.  Because the parent is 
socially and psychologically reinforced to view her relationship with the child as 
one of affectionate personal attachment, the parent may be unusually blind to 
the possibility that self-love is distorting her judgment. Moreover, one can much 
more easily justify domination of children, who obviously need some degree of 
care and guidance, than one can justify comparable (mis)treatment of adults.‖). 
SHULMAN (FINAL) 2/22/2012  11:15 AM 
2012]  Parenting Rights 
163 
withdraws love from me, I must be bad.  The ideal image of the 
parent must be preserved. 
 But the price of repression is that the child must come to 
see its own needs and desires as bad. The obedient child is thus 
trapped in a double-bind of self-abnegation. 
 
This type of parental rule takes a terrible emotional toll on 
the child.  The child comes to see its own needs and desires as 
unworthy and, accordingly, represses its evolving capacity for 
thinking and feeling independently.  To be fully loved, the child 
has no choice but to conform to, to be obedient to, the parental 
image.  And when parental authoritarianism has the sanction of 
religious authority, its emotional toll is compounded, its 
emotional effects more entrapping.  It is one thing to disobey and 
displease a parent, another to disobey and displease God.  When 
God himself demands the child‘s self-sacrifice, the child is bound 
to suffer sorely for simple acts of self-assertion. 
If the state as educator demanded submission to its 
ideological authority, we would consider that gross misconduct.237  
But we do not define the same requirement as injurious when 
required by religious mentors.  Quite the opposite: We applaud 
the obedient child—the child who, like Betty Simmons, embraces 
filial devotion, unaware of its costs. 
And because we do not define the child‘s self-sacrifice as 
injury, we do not see it. 
 
 237. Cf. Arons & Lawrence III, supra note 29, at 312 (―If the government 
were to regulate the development of ideas and opinions through, for example, a 
single television monopoly or through religious rituals for children, freedom of 
expression would become a meaningless right.‖). 
